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Executive Summary  
This report presents the results of the project Study on the feasibility of a tool to meas-
ure the macroeconomic impact of structural reforms (ECFIN-E/2005/001). This final 
report amalgamates the findings of the two previous interim reports and the main con-
clusions of the workshop held in Brussels on May 11
th. The main goal of the project is 
to determine the most reliable and robust methods to investigate the impacts of econ-
omy-wide structural reforms as well as reforms in individual markets or sectors, and to 
make suggestions as to how they best to implement them and possible improvements of 
the institutional dataset. In addition, a roadmap has been created which includes the 
main steps in the model-developing process, and solutions feasible even in the short 
term are discussed. 
The report is organised into chapters. The most important transmission channels of 
structural reforms on product, labour and financial markets are briefly reviewed in chap-
ter 1. The advantages of reform packages over isolated reforms and the impact of struc-
tural reforms on budgetary implications are addressed in chapter 2. Strategies to meas-
ure the macroeconomic impact of structural reforms are discussed in chapter 3. In chap-
ter 4, the main institutional databases are reviewed, and directions for their further im-
provement are proposed. Next, a typology of empirical tools is developed, where the 
focus is on macroeconometric methods. In particular, single equation regressions (chap-
ter 5), computable general equilibrium models (chapter 6), partial equilibrium models 
(chapter 7) and macroeconometric models including dynamic stochastic equilibrium 
models (chapter 8) are discussed. The abilities of the approaches to study the institu-
tional impact are investigated. Chapters 9 and 10 present a comparative analysis of the 
top 5 tools for modelling the impact of structural reforms. The use of the satellite mod-
els to adapt existing tools for modelling structural reforms is discussed in chapter 11, 
and suggestions to construct appropriate satellites for certain areas of reforms are given 
in chapter 12. Finally, chapter 13 summarises the main conclusions and offers a road 
map to guide further investigations on the topic.  
Structural reforms affect the institutional framework under which the economy operates. 
In fact, some markets can be prone to failures and inefficiencies, and in these cases, 
government regulations can improve the outcomes of flexible markets. On the other 
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hand, overly restrictive elements may actually worsen economic performance. Reasons 
for government failure include, inter alia, information asymmetries, management and 
incentive problems and rent-seeking behaviour by special interest groups. According to 
standard economic theory, the worldwide trend towards more market-friendly institu-
tional frameworks is expected to boost economic growth and employment. The reforms 
analysed in this project are directed towards reinforcing the functioning of product, la-
bour and financial markets, as these are the main stages for reforms. Since there have 
already been recent advances in the deregulation of financial markets, the presentation 
is focused on reforms on product and labour markets. The impact evaluation of struc-
tural reforms requires a convincing analysis of their main transmission channels. This is 
done in chapter 1. 
Moreover, structural reforms can be implemented as comprehensive packages or in an 
isolated way. Results from previous studies show that the sequence of reforms might be 
important. Moreover, interactions between different areas of structural reforms are cru-
cial for reform impact. In addition, structural reforms can lead to a costly reallocation of 
resources. Hence, gains attributed to the reforms may take some time to materialize. 
Therefore, the main conclusion from chapter 2 is that econometric tools should be able 
to distinguish between short- and long-run structural reform effects and to consider the 
possibility of evaluating a comprehensive reform strategy and the timing of implemen-
tation of the individual steps. 
The different strategies to measure the impact of structural reforms are discussed in 
chapter 3. A first aspect is whether the focus of the analysis is ex post, i.e. what has 
been the impact of reforms implemented in the past, or ex ante, i.e. what would be the 
future impact of a policy change. The ex post framework can uncover insights into the 
actual impact of structural reforms and obstacles to the reform process. However, it only 
provides useful insights about the impact of future measures if the behaviour of agents 
does not change once the reforms are implemented. In any case, counterfactual analysis 
is needed because it facilitates the understanding of the links between structural reforms 
and macroeconomic performance, all other factors being constant. To investigate the 
quantitative impact of structural reforms, the model solutions under a benchmark situa-
tion and the alternative when reforms are implemented are compared in terms of key 
variables, including output, employment and productivity. Dynamic models should be 
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preferred to static ones as information about adjustment processes is also obtained. In 
order to do this, two alternative options arise: structural reforms can be modelled either 
directly or indirectly depending on how the respective policy measures are imple-
mented. First, the effects of policy variables exogenous to the model can be analysed in 
a direct manner by simulating the change in the instrument. Second, reforms might have 
an indirect impact of macroeconomic variables of interest which is transmitted through 
intermediate variables. This second approximation requires the use of appropriate in-
formation on institutional indicators and involves two steps: in a first step, the impact of 
structural reform is measured on intermediate variables such as mark ups to wages and 
prices or TFP and, in a second step the effect on this intermediate variable is included in 
the model. 
Chapter 4 reviews the main institutional databases and provides a critical analysis of the 
quality of the reported variables. With internationally comparable information for dif-
ferent countries at hand, the impact of reforms can be studied by means of cross section 
models. For the analysis of a sequence of structural reforms, interactions between struc-
tural reforms in different areas and adjustment processes of the economy, however, time 
series information on the institutional setting is indispensable. The time series dimen-
sion is also required to distinguish between the impacts of institutions and other socio-
demographic characteristics. In a panel setting, the latter can be bounded in country-
specific fixed effects and therefore separated from the institutional effect. 
Institutional data can be gathered from a number of sources: OECD, the Fraser Institute, 
and the European Commission, among others. The survey presented in chapter 4 con-
cludes that no commonly agreed reform indicator is currently available, though the 
OECD, together with the LABREF and MICREF databases, seem to provide the most 
comprehensive sources on product and labour market institutions and structural reforms. 
Nevertheless, there are significant gaps even in these datasets, and the missing values 
need to be interpolated. Often the variables only allow insights with regard to the direc-
tion, not to the size of the institutional impact, as many regulation indicators are rank 
scaled. Thus, no results regarding the required strength of structural reforms are ob-
tained by these measures. Quantitative indicators would be indispensable, so efforts 
should also be dedicated to constructing them. In some cases, suitable proxies are avail-
able for the regulation measure. For example, elements of the administrative burden 
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might be expressed as number of days necessary to start a new business, or in terms of 
working time needed to fulfil bureaucratic requirements. The involvement of the state in 
the economy can be measured as the share of government consumption and investment 
in GDP. Other indicators are already available on a quantitative basis, such as trade un-
ion densities, unemployment benefits or tertiary education and the number of research-
ers as proxies for human capital stock. 
In the second part of the report, a typology of different econometric approaches is de-
veloped. Different approaches have been proposed to examine the impact of structural 
reforms. One classification of these approaches is related to the level of the analysis, 
where micro- and macroeconometric methods can be distinguished. This report focuses 
on macroeconometric methods, where homogeneous agents like representative house-
holds and firms are typically assumed. The abilities of the different approaches to exam-
ine the institutional impact are discussed. The main tools that researchers have used to 
quantify the benefits of structural reforms can be classified into four groups: single 
equation methods, general equilibrium models (CGE), including partial equilibrium 
(PE) techniques and macroeconometric including dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium models (DSGEs). 
Single equation regressions (chapter 5) are largely specified in an ad hoc manner, espe-
cially when a one-step strategy is employed. The transmission channels from structural 
policies to macroeconomic performance are considered in isolation. In the case of the 
one-step models, a difficulty in the interpretation of the results is that they do not relate 
reforms to actual measures of market competition, and the channels by which reforms 
may affect productivity growth or investment are not made clear. Thus, they do not 
show that the reforms considered lead to an increase in competition, or how these fac-
tors are related to economic growth at industry level. 
These elements can be ascertained using a two-step strategy. Under a two-step frame-
work, intermediate variables are used as transmitters of the institutional impact, such as 
mark-ups to wages and prices, TFP or entry and exit rates of firms in different markets. 
Nevertheless, several criticisms can also be made of this approach. It reveals unbiased 
estimates only if other impacts are negligible. In particular, the two-step strategy fo-
cuses on those indirect effects that are transmitted through the chosen variables. The 
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indirect effect does not sufficiently capture the total impact if direct channels are at 
work. The two-step strategy will usually fail to deliver unbiased estimates if direct ef-
fects cannot be excluded. Even the indirect effect cannot be determined in an unbiased 
manner if the two effects are correlated. 
Multiequation models provide a more nuanced view of the institutional impact, as link-
ages between the macroeconomic or sectoral variables are taken into account. Two 
broad classes of models are considered in this report: computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models, including partial models, and macroeconometric models, including dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. 
CGE models (chapter 6) are heavily built on microeconomic theory and theoretical co-
herence. As the equations are founded on optimization principles, the Lucas critique can 
be avoided. Complex interactions between policy settings and outcomes are guided by 
economic theory and described within a well-defined framework designed to capture 
both the direct impact of any policy changes and the indirect effects of such changes on 
economic activity and trade patterns. Most parameters are calibrated using information 
from a base year, where the economy is in equilibrium. Hence, there is a lack of empiri-
cal underpinning, and results can be largely driven by the model assumptions. On the 
other hand, data requirements are not very strong, and this allows the inclusion of a 
large number of sectors. One caveat with these models is that they can become quite 
complex, thereby making it harder to determine whether the results are really robust. 
Partial models (chapter 7) are often used as a convenient way to describe specific sec-
tors, their attraction being the detail that can be achieved in the modelling exercise. The 
effects of policy actions are examined only in the directly affected markets. Thus, the 
analysis ignores spillovers from or into other sectors, or assumes that the sector under 
study is very small and has only little impact on the rest of the economy. 
In contrast to CGEs, macroeconometric models (chapter 8) are empirically validated. 
Due to nominal rigidities, estimation is made in two steps. After specifying the long-run 
properties by cointegration analysis or calibration techniques, the short-run adjustment 
is modelled, where lag structures are often justified by the empirical fit. Dynamic ef-
fects could, however, also occur within the optimization framework, for example due to 
the presence of adjustment costs for investment, habit formation and labour hoarding. In 
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fact, rigorously model building upon optimizing behaviour of agents has led to the de-
velopment of DSGE models, the main difference between them and the more traditional 
Keynesian style macroeconometric models being that both the parameters and the 
shocks to the structural equations are related to deeper structural parameters describing 
preferences of households and technological and institutional constraints. 
The microfoundation has three key advantages. First, they provide a sound theoretical 
structure of the model being estimated. Second, the reduced-form parameters are related 
to deeper structural ones. The latter are less likely to change in response to a change in 
the policy regime, which means that the Lucas critique will lose its relevance. Thus, 
DSGEs might be more suited for policy analysis. Third, the specification of the behav-
iour of economic agentscan be used to examine welfare-relevant questions. As DSGE 
models are explicitly derived from optimization behaviour of agents, one can evaluate 
alternative policies in terms of their effects on consumer welfare. Like CGEs, these 
models are quite complex and are mainly suited to studying the long-run impact of 
structural reforms. Thus, for the short-run, Keynesian style macroeconometric models 
can still provide an appropriate tool. 
In the third part of the report, the most appropriate models to study the macroeconomic 
impact of structural reforms are reviewed. In chapter 9, the basic structure of the models 
is presented and in chapter 10, comparative model advantages are discussed. The pres-
entation is limited to five of the most relevant models: two CGE models (WorldScan, 
GreenMod), one macroeconometric model based on a sectoral and regional disaggrega-
tion (E3ME) and two DSGE models (GEM, QUEST). This selection is motivated by the 
theoretical soundness of the models, previous simulation experience, and documenta-
tion. All of them are based on simultaneous equation systems and are focused on the 
entire economy. Hence, the approaches allow a wide range of structural reforms to be 
examined and possible spillovers between the variables to be taken into account. More 
attention has been paid to the relative advantages and disadvantages of Worldscan and 
QUEST as both models are currently used by the European Commission to assess the 
impact of structural reforms. 
In our view, the use of QUEST has some advantages over Worldscan. In particular, 
QUEST permits consideration of adjustment processes. However, the inclusion in 
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Worldscan of the sectoral perspective and the possibility of considering different skills 
in labour allows the analysis of reforms targeted to specific sectors, such as network 
liberalization or deregulation in certain industries, or reforms affecting low income 
earners. QUEST also has comparative advantages concerning the specification of gov-
ernment behaviour. It should be noted, however, that in all cases the actual magnitude 
of shocks to be inserted in the core models is unclear in one way or another and could 
require some element of judgement in the simulation process. For this reason, possible 
strategies to examine structural reforms combining core and satellite models are dis-
cussed in the fourth part of the report. In chapter 11, the typology of reforms that could 
be evaluated by satellite models is described and in chapter 12, the satellite models to be 
linked to QUEST for modelling product and labour market reforms and the role of R&D 
are briefly described. The tradeoff between developing satellite models and improving 
the structure of the core model is also adressed, and interactions between different satel-
lite models and between satellites and the core models are considered. 
The fifth part of the report summarises the main findings. From our point of view, the 
most relevant conclusion from the study is that the most appropriate tool that can be 
developed in the short term is the integration of a DSGE model (preferably QUEST due 
to its in-house availability) with different satellite models, to be developed. The need of 
satellite models is related to the fact that some structural reforms cannot be considered 
directly within the QUEST model. For a few reforms in the tax and social security sys-
tem, the effects can be implemented directly as these policy variables are explicitly in-
cluded in the model. However, this is not the case for the majority of reforms. The satel-
lite model is used in a first stage in quantifying the effect of a given policy change on an 
intermediate variable, which is exogenous in the QUEST model. Then, in a second 
stage, the change in this variable is evaluated within the model in order to obtain the 
simulation results of the reforms considered. The main advantage of satellite models is 
that they can be constructed fairly easily, without changing the more complex structure 
of the core model, which makes the model more flexible in investigating new policy 
issues. 
In addition to the construction of satellite models, the structure of the core model could 
also be modified in order to include the effect of structural reforms. The main advantage 
of this approach is that the transmission channel is already incorporated into the main 
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model and therefore the effect of the structural reforms is considered directly. The op-
tion of expanding the core model with more detailed formal submodels is theoretically 
more attractive, because it imposes theoretical consistency. However, the main problem 
is the change of the core model. Since CGEs and DSGEs are heavily built on microeco-
nomic theory, the behavioural equations are determined by microeconomic principles, 
which might be not always feasible. Even where there is a rigorous theoretical base for 
the specification of the additional equations, the main disadvantages of this approach is 
that it is time-consuming, can be applied only for a limited number of policy fields, adds 
complexity to the core model and makes it quickly unmanageable and possibly unstable. 
Problems in the model solution might arise due to numerical limitations in the solving 
algorithms. 
In order to develop satellite models, the cross section dimension should be extended by 
time series information in order to study possible delays in the impact of structural re-
forms. For this reason, the best option seems to be to build satellites upon a (dynamic) 
panel structure, where the impact of the reforms will be separated from other country 
characteristics embedded in the fixed effects. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in 
mind that this approach would not yield country-specific impacts of the reforms. Only 
an average effect will be gathered from this analysis. 
 
Summarizing, the analysis of the impact of structural reforms on macroeconomic per-
formance could be improved by taking the following steps: 
Step 1: Identification of the structural reforms to be evaluated and the main transmission 
channels 
Step 2: Collection of quantitative indicators related to the selected structural reforms 
Step 3:  Construction of single equation or partial equilibrium models as satellites to be 
integrated with the QUEST model 
Step 4: Ex-post and ex-ante evaluation of structural reforms using the QUEST with the 
satellite models 






Introduction and objectives 
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The main aim of this study is to assess the feasibility of empirical tools to study the im-
pact of structural reforms on the macroeconomic performance in the member countries 
of the European Union (EU). Structural reforms change the institutional framework on 
under which the economy operates. Macroeconomic performance is measured, for ex-
ample, by productivity, output and employment growth. Generally, structural reforms 
improve the long run record of the economy both in terms of macroeconomic growth 
and perspectives of workers to get better and more appropriate jobs. However, the posi-
tive effects might appear only after a transition period. In the adjustment process to the 
new institutional framework, existing firms might decline, and unemployment can in-
crease for a while. Long term gains and short term losses require a distinction between 
the long and short run multipliers of structural reforms. To comply with these require-
ments, a typology of empirical strategies is developed. Institutional databases and the 
quality of the variables therein are addressed. Different methods, like single equation 
regressions, partial and general equilibrium and macroeconometric models are re-
viewed, and their capabilities to study the institutional impact are discussed. The possi-
bility of using satellite models to adapt existing tools for modelling structural reforms is 
also considered. The main goal of the project is to determine the most reliable and ro-
bust methods to investigate the impacts of economy wide reforms as well as reforms in 
individual markets or sectors, together with suggestions on their appropriate implemen-
tation and possible improvements of the institutional dataset. 
This is the final report of the study. It collects the findings of the three previous interim 
reports and the main conclusions of the workshop held in Brussels on May 11th 2006. 
The report is organized in different chapters. In the next chapter (chapter 1), the most 
important transmission channels of structural reforms are reviewed. The presentation is 
focused on structural reforms in product, labour and financial markets. In chapter 2, 
comprehensive reforms in these areas are considered as an alternative to individual 
measures, and evidence regarding the appropriate sequence of reforms is presented. 
Reform packages could eventually help to overcome resistance, as they can provide 
some compensation of the losers. Chapter 3 is devoted to the impact assessment of 
structural reforms. In chapter 4, the main institutional databases are discussed, and di-
rections to their further improvement are proposed. Next, a typology of empirical tools 
is developed. As the focus of the report is on the macroside of the economy, most meth-
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ods assume homogeneous agents, like households and firms. However, heterogeneities 
are allowed to some extent. In particular, single equation regressions (chapter 5), com-
putable general equilibrium models (chapter 6), partial equilibrium models (chapter 7) 
and macroeconometric models including dynamic stochastic equilibrium models (chap-
ter 8) are reviewed. The abilities of the approaches to study the institutional impact are 
investigated. Some existing top models are presented in chapter 9, and a comparative 
analysis of these approaches is provided in chapter 10. The use of the satellite models to 
extent the simulation capabilities of the existing tools is discussed in chapter 11, and 
chapter 12 presents construction principles for satellites in certain reform areas. Finally, 
chapter 13 holds the main findings of the report, together with a roadmap addressing the 
main steps to further model development. 
 
1  Transmission channels of structural reforms 
At the Lisbon council, the EU has launched its comprehensive strategy of reforms as an 
important precondition to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge based 
economy in the world. To reach this goal, the Lisbon strategy puts heavy weight on 
structural reforms, notably on product, labour, and financial markets in the EU member 
states. The implementation of these measures is regularly monitored by the Commis-
sion. In the current cyclical upturn, however, economic growth in the EU has been 
rather modest until recently, compared to the high performing industrial regions in the 
world. The disappointing strength of the recovery is probably due to a lack of imple-
mentation of the reforms, especially in the product and labour markets. For example, 
participation in the labour force is still below the Lisbon target, while unemployment 
has remained at high levels. It should be noted, that progress in the reform process is 
spread unevenly across EU member states. While some countries have deregulated their 
product and labour markets to a certain extent, others lag behind. 
The introduction of the EMU has likely reinforced the need of structural reforms, as 
monetary policy or nominal exchange rate adjustments are no longer available for indi-
vidual countries to respond to asymmetric shocks. Due to trade integration, for example, 
specialisation patterns of the member states may have become more important, imply-
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ing that the probability for asymmetric shocks could increase. In the absence of substan-
tial migration flows into prosperous regions, appropriate reforms could strengthen mar-
ket-based adjustment processes. Restrictions on fiscal policies constrain the use of this 
instrument unless a country starts from a position of a budget surplus. On the other 
hand, structural reforms might be more difficult to implement under EMU conditions. 
For example, given that the reforms increase potential output, higher demand in the re-
form-oriented countries is required. If agents are not entirely forward-looking, they do 
not fully anticipate the rise in permanent income and therefore, a lower real interest rate 
would help to reduce excess supply in the product market. However, monetary policy is 
conducted not only for individual countries, but jointly for both reformers and non-
reformers, thereby exerting negative effects for the reforming countries. A further as-
pect refers to the external balance. Due to rising imports, the current account is likely to 
worsen for the reformer countries, thereby increasing foreign debt. In this situation, the 
non reformers might profit from running a beggar-my-neighbour strategy. As a conse-
quence, a more coordinated reforming strategy between the member states must be on 
the political agenda. 
Structural reforms affect the institutional framework under which the economy operates. 
In fact, some markets can be prone to failures and inefficiencies, and in these cases, 
government regulations can foster the outcomes of flexible markets. On the other hand, 
overly restrictive elements may actually worsen the economic performance. Reasons for 
government failure include, inter alia, information asymmetries, management and incen-
tive problems and rent-seeking behaviour of special interest groups. According to stan-
dard economic theory, the worldwide trend towards more market-friendly institutional 
frameworks is expected to boost economic growth and employment. The reforms ana-
lyzed in this project are directed to reinforce the functioning of product, labour and fi-
nancial markets, as these are the main stages for reforms. 
 
Product market reforms 
Product market reforms are a key ingredient to achieve and preserve a higher path of 
long-term growth. Direct effects on growth are due to the removal of barriers to pene-
trate new markets and to the decrease in the costs of doing business. The effects actually 
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translate into increases in productivity through three main transmission channels, see 
Ahn (2002). Reforms are expected to lead to allocative efficiency gains by reducing 
incumbent firms’ market power and by higher market contestability through an increase 
in the number of competitive firms and lower entrance barriers. The rise in the level of 
competition will lead to a reduction in price mark-up and to a better allocation of re-
sources as less efficient firms exit the market and are replaced by more productive new 
entrants. Another channel is through an increase in productive efficiency by raising the 
incentives to organise work more efficiently. Third, the incentives of firms to carry out 
research and innovate are improved. As a consequence, they could move to the technol-
ogy frontier more rapidly. 
Allocative and productive efficiency gains are static in nature, because they refer to one-
time changes in the productivity level. As a consequence, the acceleration of productiv-
ity growth is limited to an adjustment period. In contrast, dynamic efficiency gains can 
boost productivity over a longer period of time. Given the prospects of Schumpeterian 
rents, the incentives to research and innovate are stimulated in a competitive environ-
ment. More precisely, an inverted U type relationship between the level of competition 
and innovation seems to be appropriate, with both very high and very low levels of 
competition bad for innovation. Therefore, the impact of rise in competition is not clear 
a priori, and it might also depend on the gap to the technological leader and the industry 
considered. 
Tougher competition encourages firms to innovate in order to get monopolistic rents, 
but it also reduces the rewards from innovation. However, incremental net profits might 
be generated even in neck-and-neck industries, as pre-innovation rents may be cut more 
than past-innovation rents (Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers, 2001). Limitations to 
competition are beneficial in the short run to apply patents, but these barriers have to 
disappear in the long run. Higher R&D expenditures and human capital accumulation 
enhance the transfer of technologies by improving the absorptive capacities of firms and 
innovation at the technological frontier. Some researchers have argued that institutions 
in the EU are better suited for the catching up process. In contrast, institutions in the US 
seem to support innovation at the frontier (Aghion, 2004). 
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Labour market reforms 
Properly designed institutions are of key importance for a smooth working of the labour 
market (see Agell, 1999, Blanchard, 2004, and Bertola, 2004). Information problems on 
both the workers and firms’ side generate imperfections in the matching and monitoring 
process. Different degrees of market power of the wage contractors and the risk of be-
coming unemployed also require an appropriate mix of the institutional framework. 
Structural reforms should improve the employment and income perspectives of workers, 
while avoiding persistent tendencies in unemployment. 
Wages play a crucial role in this regard. If institutions reduce wage flexibility, a smooth 
adjustment of labour in response to shocks is more complicated. From the perspective 
of workers, wages represent labour income, which can be spent on consumption and 
saving. From the employers’ point of view, they are costs and determine the capital-
labour ratio in the production process. In the competitive equilibrium, real wages are 
expected to be equal to labour productivity. But this rule has only a stabilizing effect on 
employment and is not sufficient to raise the chances of the unemployed to get back into 
work. In order to reduce unemployment, nominal wages must increase by less than the 
sum of expected price inflation and trend productivity growth on the average. In con-
trast, excess wage increases can contribute to a rise in inflation or a rise in unemploy-
ment or both. 
It should be noted, that the importance of structural reforms is not limited to the wage 
formation process. For example, employment protection legislation strengthens the bar-
gaining power of insiders compared to outsiders, implying that the responsiveness of 
wages to economic conditions might be lowered. The design of the tax and transfer sys-
tem also has a likely impact on the duration and the efforts for seeking new jobs. 
Higher unemployment benefits and longer duration periods for receiving these benefits 
reduce the gap between the net wage earnings (take-home pay) and transfer payments. 
Thus, the incentives of households to work will decrease. The unemployed will become 
choosier about filling vacancies, and the matching process tends to be less effective. On 
the other hand, the willingness to invest in human capital might be more supported in 
the restrictive environment. Because the search process can last some time, the chances 
to obtain a suitable job are improved. In the low productivity segment, appropriate re-
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forms of the tax and social security system can widen the difference between unem-
ployment benefits and a minimum wage, thereby avoiding unemployment traps for the 
low qualified. 
 
Financial market reforms 
Structural reforms in financial markets also have substantial effects on macroeconomic 
activity. Higher integrated financial markets will allow capital to flow where the returns 
are highest. The most efficient and productive firms can expand and increase employ-
ment. Moreover, the financial system is essential for embedding technical advances in 
the capital stock, especially in periods of rapid technological change. The opportunity to 
share risks via the financial system can encourage savers to allocate a higher fraction of 
assets to riskier projects, which on average might be more beneficial for the entire 
economy. The availability of financial intermediaries can lead to an improved evalua-
tion and selection of investment projects. Capital productivity will increase through the 
selection and monitoring of the most profitable projects. The availability of liquid fi-
nancial markets also allows a larger proportion of savings to be invested in projects of 
long-term duration. 
According to the indices reported by the Fraser Institute, European financial markets are 
already deregulated, while product and labour markets have a substantial backlog in this 
area, see Gwartney, Lawson with Gartzke (2005). On a rank scale between 0 and 10, 
where higher numbers indicate higher liberalization, the degree of financial deregulation 
is around 8 on the EU average, compared to a value of 4 in the case of labour markets. 
Thus, the study focuses mainly on product and labour market reforms. Clearly, this does 
not imply that further financial reforms would be obsolete. From the perspective of pri-
vate households, for example, consumption expenditures do not only depend on perma-
nent, but also on actual income, and the latter might be interpreted as evidence for the 
existence of severe liquidity constraints. If crunches on financial markets prevail, future 
consumption needs cannot be sufficiently financed through credit. The inability to bor-
row in bad times provides an additional motive for accumulating assets when times are 
good. Improved access to credit markets because of structural reforms in the banking 
sector should result in a decrease of the share of households subject to liquidity con-
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straints, thereby reducing the propensity to save over the business cycle. In this sense, 
the financial reforms in the late 1970s and in the 1980s in the US and Canada have con-
tributed to a substantial fall in the share of liquidity-constrained consumers, see Sefton 
and In’t Veld (1999). 
 
2  Individual vs comprehensive reforms 
In order to exploit the long term gains from structural reforms, their sequence might be 
relevant. Generally, a more comprehensive strategy can dominate isolated reforms, and 
the timing of the implementation might be crucial. For example, if only capital and 
product markets are deregulated while labour markets are not, the incentives for human 
capital accumulation might not be optimally designed, and this could provide a serious 
bottleneck for the adoption and diffusion of new technologies. See Belot and van Ours 
(2001) for a model, which underpins the relevance of interactions between institutions 
especially in the labour market. Belot and van Ours (2001) use data of 18 OECD coun-
tries over the period 1960-1994. They investigate the relationship between unemploy-
ment rate and labour market institutions in particular tax and replacement rates, em-
ployment protection, union density, and the level of bargaining. 
By isolating structural from cyclical factors in a panel of industrial countries, Estevão 
(2005) has demonstrated that the effectiveness of wage moderation (measured by the 
productivity and unemployment adjusted wage change) on real GDP growth and the 
unemployment rate depends on the level of product market regulation. In particular, 
weaker competition and higher barriers of market entry would limit the positive effects 
on GDP growth and unemployment by allowing incumbent firms to appropriate larger 
rents. Koeniger and Vindigni (2003) have looked at a model with step-by-step innova-
tions. Less employment protection may raise the incentives of firms to innovate, but this 
depends on the level of competition already achieved in product markets. For reason-
able parameter values, competition fosters growth substantially more in the flexible than 
in the constrained environment. 
Using a general equilibrium model, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) have studied the 
effects of product and labour market deregulation. Their model is based on two central 
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assumptions: monopolistic competition in the product market, which determines the size 
of rents; and unionized bargaining in the labour market, which determines the distribu-
tion of rents between workers and firms. According to the results, higher competition in 
product markets reduces the rents available for redistribution in a bargaining process 
between union and firms. Thus, by introducing higher competition in the product mar-
ket first, opposition and political resistance against labour market reforms would decline 
and prepare the grounds for further structural reforms. As the argument goes, a decline 
of monopolistic rents in the goods market limits the scope of distribution of incomes 
between firms and workers. Wages tend to be more moderate and will encourage output 
and employment growth. Therefore, the labour market performance is expected to im-
prove in response to suitable reforms on product markets. 
Bertola and Koeniger (2004) have found that credit constraints exert a less restrictive 
impact in countries with more regulated labour and product markets. If labour income 
tends to be rather smooth and income mobility is rather low, the desire of workers to 
borrow will be reduced. Due to structural reforms, prospects of upward income mobility 
can increase, but they have smaller positive effects when credit constraints are binding. 
Hence, higher income insecurity makes the lack of consumption smoothing instruments 
more painful. To raise the welfare in the economy, labour market deregulation has to be 
accompanied by reforms aimed at easing borrowing constraints. 
The evidence taken from these studies has two major implications: First, in addition to 
the analysis of specific institutions, empirical models have to account for interactions 
between different areas of structural reforms. Second, the sequence of reforms is impor-
tant but no clear cut conclusion seems to emerge from the literature. Annett and Debrun 
(2004) provide indirect evidence for the lead of product market reforms, as they 
Granger cause reforms on the labour market; but not vice versa. However, there is also 
empirical support that interactions between product and labour markets dominate, see 
OECD (2005a). Suitable empirical tools should provide additional and robust evidence 
on these issues. 
Reforms are microeconomic in nature and act on the supply side of the economy. By 
stimulating the behaviour of economic agents, the preconditions for a rise in productiv-
ity, output and employment will be improved. If the gains could be exploited, the EU 
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would be more resistant to a temporary slowdown of the world economy. Because the 
EU will be on a higher growth path mainly caused by domestic factors like consumption 
and business investment, adverse developments in other regions should have less dis-
torting effects. As a serious drawback, the stimulating effects cannot be expected to be 
realized as a free lunch. Structural reforms can involve longer periods of adjustment. 
Gains attributed to the reforms take some time to materialize, as the change in the insti-
tutional framework can lead to a costly reallocation of resources. The transition period 
might imply the disappearance or decline of incumbent firms, and unemployment might 
increase for a while, see Salgado (2002). 
Furthermore, structural reforms affect the distribution of current and future income in 
the economy. If a sufficiently large number of firms and households are uncertain about 
the consequences of the reforms and attach some probability to be among the losers, 
they might prefer the status quo of no reforms, even knowing that the alternative would 
be beneficial for the entire economy (Fernández and Rodrik, 1991). Obstacles to the 
reform process might also arise, if the advantages take long time to realize, accrue to no 
clearly identifiable group, and are widely dispersed with only limited benefit for each 
individual. Also in this sense, comprehensive strategies might be seen as an important 
instrument for improving the support for structural reforms as they can provide com-
pensation of losers, see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). 
In any case, the feasibility of reforms requires a convincing analysis of their main 
transmission channels. On the base of this analysis, the short and long term effects can 
be valued, and appropriate reform options can be identified. One further methodological 
aspect is the capability to disentangle the impact of structural reforms from effects at-
tributed to an increase in foreign trade or EU integration. 
In addition, the budgetary implications of structural reforms should be considered. In 
particular, there could be a tradeoff between short-term budgetary objectives stressed in 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the implementation of reforms that could im-
prove public finances on a permanent base, after adjustment has occurred. In fact, this 
idea was recently reflected in the reform of the SGP: under certain conditions, structural 
reforms can be taken into account in the country’s budget position. Using fiscal reaction 
functions in a panel of EU countries, Deroose and Turrini (2005) found evidence that 
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product, labour market and pension reforms can be associated with deterioration in pub-
lic budgets, but the results do not seem to be very strong. According to Pitlik (2003) and 
Heinemann (2005), conflicts between fiscal prudence and structural reforms are often of 
minor importance even in the short run. These findings suggest that fiscal consolidation 
can be achieved even in the aftermath of structural reforms. The rational expectations 
assumption might be crucial in this regard. A decrease of social protection could lead 
people to increase precautionary savings, thereby worsening the short run economic 
performance (Duval and Elmeskov, 2005). As most of this literature is carried out by 
means of single equation analysis and institutional indicators, a more thorough exami-
nation within more elaborated models is highly recommended to arrive at more definite 
conclusions. 
 
3  Impact assessment of structural reforms 
According to the EU Commission (2004a), it is extremely difficult to quantify the im-
pact of reforms taking into account their heterogeneity, the time lags in their implemen-
tation and their focus on the long run, more or less exclusively. In addition, the empiri-
cal results could be affected by methodological differences among in the empirical stud-
ies. This aspect will be further considered in the following sections. 
In general, it is important to note whether the focus of the analysis is ex post, i.e. what 
has been the impact of reforms implemented in the past, or ex ante, i.e. what would be 
the future impact of a policy change (Hertel and Reimer, 2004). Both type of studies are 
based on past data. The ex post framework can uncover insights into the actual impact 
of reforms and obstacles to the reform process. In that sense, the experience with past 
reforms is helpful to improve a smooth implementation of future reforms, for example, 
in terms of their sequence and communication strategies. The ex post analysis can also 
provide information about the future impact of policy measures. However, this interpre-
tation requires that the behaviour of agents does not change once the reforms are im-
plemented. Therefore, the behavioural relationships have to be specified more carefully. 
In particular, if the equations arise from optimization principles of private households 
and firms, they might be robust to a higher extent, and the parameter regime should not 
be affected by policy measures (Lucas, 1976). 
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In any case, counterfactual analysis is needed because it facilitates the understanding of 
the links between structural reforms and the macroeconomic performance, holding all 
other factors constant. The impact analysis of structural reforms requires a benchmark 
solution of the model. The implementation of reforms defines an alternative model envi-
ronment. To investigate the quantitative impact of structural reforms, the model solu-
tions under the benchmark and alternative are compared in terms of the key variables, 
including output, employment and productivity. In static models, long run steady states 
are compared, while adjustment processes are ignored. The latter requires the frame-
work of dynamic models. Insights into the short and long term consequences of the re-
forms can be revealed from a dynamic specification, as the comparison to the bench-
mark can be made for different periods of time. 
In principle, both level and difference models can be used to investigate the impact of 
structural reforms. If the model variables are denoted in logarithms, the difference ap-
proaches can also be seen as specifications in terms of growth rates. In a similar spirit, 
models based on deviations from equilibrium could be constructed. The equations refer 
to the long run in a level specification, but to the short run in models based on differ-
enced variables. The level approach can be implemented both in terms of static and dy-
namic models. In contrast, models in differences are only consistent with a dynamic 
setting. As the institutional impact is expected to materialize in the medium or long run, 
the level approach seems to be more appropriate. This choice can be also underpinned 
by fundamental arguments, as economic theory is often expressed only in terms of lev-
els, but not in differences. Nevertheless, both specifications can provide useful insights 
into the length of the adjustment process. 
It should be noted, however, that severe limitations on the institutional data have to be 
taken into account. Institutional variables may not be available at the desired frequency. 
Missing values might be a serious problem, and interpolation can bias the empirical 
results. In addition, many indicators are only rank-scaled. They allow insights into the 
direction, but not into the size of the institutional impact. For the latter, quantitative in-
dicators would be indispensable. 
Given the limited quality of some of the institutional indicators, they should be used 
rather carefully in macroeconomic relationships. Usually, they can be easier imple-
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mented in a single regression framework, where a direct effect on economic variables or 
parameters of interest can be explored. From the perspective of the more elaborated 
econometric methods, indicators might be employed in some kind of satellite model. In 
these models, the indicators have a direct impact only on a few variables. The respective 
relationships can be studied in more detail, thereby providing evidence into the robust-
ness of the results. 
A two-step strategy can be helpful to discuss the impacts of reforms, in particular from 
the perspective of the multiequation frameworks. Certain reforms could directly affect 
the TFP rate (technology shock) or the mark up to wages or prices (competition shock). 
Since these series are usually exogenous or can be treated in this way, the impact on the 
transmission variable can be investigated in advance. After determining the sign of the 
institutional impact, the TFP rate is adjusted, and the new variable is embedded into the 
larger models, where it can cause a different outcome of other key variables, such as 
output, employment or productivity. As many indicators are only rank-scaled, the quan-
titative change in the transmission variables is arbitrary. 
In principle, the same approach can be employed if the sign of the institutional impact is 
unclear from a theoretical point of view. One can estimate the direction of the impact on 
the parameters of interest by means of a cross section or panel regression, where the 
elasticities are endogenous and the reform indicators are exogenous. For example, Este-
vao (2005) has studied the institutional effects on real wage elasticities of labour de-
mand and supply. A change in this elasticity might result from a shock in the degree of 
labour market competition. Note that this method can serve as a tool to provide evi-
dence with regard to the stability of the relationships. If the impact of institutions on the 
elasticities is significant, the parameter regime will likely change in response to policy 
measures, and the results should be interpreted with care. 
Because of their limited quality of the indicators, alternative strategies might be used 
instead. Structural reforms can be expressed in terms of the model variables, i.e. trans-
lated into cost categories. For example, Gelauff and Lejour (2006a) have calculated the 
costs of administrative burdens to firms in terms of wages paid to workers, and London 
Economics (2002) has estimated the cost of finance to study the impact of further EU 
financial market integration. Kilponen and Ripatti (2005) have adjusted the parameters 
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for the mark up in the wage and price setting module to study the effects of an increase 
in competition in product and labour markets. Roeger and in’t Veld (2002) have looked 
at the Lisbon goal of a higher employment rate, implemented by a reduction of the res-
ervation wage. While institutional indicators are usually employed in a single equation 
analysis, model based indicators are often used as an alternative in the more sophisti-
cated approaches. In any case, the indicators would be still informative in a descriptive 
sense, that is, in order to assess the state and change of regulation and for comparisons 
across countries. 
 
4  Overview of available databases on institutional reforms 
In order to investigate the impact of institutions on the macroeconomic performance, 
appropriate data on the institutional framework must be available. With internationally 
comparable information for different countries at hand, the impact can be studied by 
means of cross section models. For the analysis of a sequence of structural reforms, in-
teractions between structural reforms in different areas and adjustment processes of the 
economy, however, time series information of the institutional setting is indispensable. 
The time series dimension is also required to distinguish between the impacts of institu-
tions and other sociodemographic characteristics. In a panel setting, the latter can be 
bounded in country specific fixed effects and therefore separated from the institutional 
effect. This section reviews the main institutional databases and provides a critical dis-
cussion of the quality of the variables therein. 
Institutional data can be gathered from a number of sources. The OECD International 
Regulation Database is a comprehensive set of indicators about the state of regulation 
and market structures in OECD countries. Areas covered focus on economy wide regu-
lations regarding product and labour markets and on information for individual sectors, 
including electricity supply, telecommunication and retail trade. It is worth mentioning 
that during the second trimester of 2006, the OECD will publish sectoral indicators 
measuring the ‘knock-on’ effects of regulation in non-manufacturing sectors on all sec-
tors of the economy (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). These indicators, known as Regula-
tion Impact (RI) indicators, have been estimated over the period 1975 to 2003 for 36 
ISIC rev 3 sectors in 21 OECD countries. The estimation procedure combines informa-
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tion about the extent of anti-competitive regulation in non-manufacturing sectors and 
the importance of these sectors as suppliers of intermediate inputs. The Fraser Institute 
provides extensive information of indicators relevant to product, labour and financial 
markets, see Gwartney and Lawson with the assistance of Gartzke (2005). Recently, the 
EU Commission has launched its labour market reforms (LABREF) database with in-
formation about policy measures which are likely have an influence on the labour mar-
ket performance and efforts are now focused on the elaboration of a new data set related 
to structural reforms in the area of product markets (MICREF). Finally, institutional 
data have been collected in several papers of the literature. For example, the Nickell and 
Nunziata database (2001, 2003) has annual information on certain labour market institu-
tions available for long periods of time. 
In empirical studies on the institutional impact on the economic performance, these da-
tabases are usually involved. In addition, information taken from different sources can 
be helpful in to address the robustness of the results. It should be noted, that the indica-
tors are normally recorded on the base of objective data about rules and regulations. 
This isolates the indicators from context specific assessments and makes them compa-
rable across countries, but also imply severe limitations. In particular, informal regula-
tory practices, such as administrative guidance, self disciplinary measures of profes-
sional associations or the enforcement of rules are often not captured by these indica-
tors. For example, the practices of labour courts are very decisive for the actual strength 
of employment protection legislation. In the following, the main databases are discussed 
in detail. 
 
OECD International Regulation Database 
The OECD International Regulation Database is focused on measures for product and 
labour market institutions. Indicators for both the entire economy and certain sectors 
have been developed. Most indicators are available on a rank scale, where higher values 
indicate an increase in regulation. 
OECD Indicators on product market regulation are summarized in table 1. Recently, an 
overall indicator for the degree of product market regulation (PMR) in the economy has 
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been developed, see Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005) and OECD (2005). Both in-
ward and outward oriented regulation policies are considered. Inward oriented variables 
are slightly higher-weighted and include state control measures and barriers to entrepre-
neurship, such as scope of the public enterprise sector, the degree of price controls, limi-
tations to competition, administrative burdens on corporations and other regulatory ele-
ments. Outward oriented policies refer to barriers in foreign trade and investment, such 
as foreign ownership barriers, tariffs and discriminatory procedures. 
Table 1: OECD indicators on product market regulation 
Economy-wide regulation (PMR)  State control of business enterprises, le-
gal and administrative barriers to entre-
preneurship, impediments to international 




Entrance barriers to firms, public owner-
ship, market structures in airlines, tele-
com, electricity, gas, post, rail, and road 
freight sector 
Retail trade  Price controls, regulations on shop open-
ing hours and outlets, protection of firms, 
registration in commercial register, li-
cences or permits for commercial activity 
Sectoral regula-
tion 
Professional services  Accounting, architect, engineer, and legal 
service: licensing, education, regulations 
on the form of business, prices and fees, 
inter-professional cooperations 
 
Overall, the PMR indicator is based a pyramid system, where the bottom level is de-
fined by 16 subsindicators. The latter spans most of the elements of the general regula-
tory practices. In addition, some sector specific aspects are included. To calculate these 
indicators, qualitative survey information –such as yes/no answers- is coded by assign-
  24 
ing a numerical value to each of the responses to a certain question (Conway, Janod and 
Nicoletti, 2005). The quantitative values are subdivided into classes using a system of 
thresholds. They are normalised over a scale from 0 to 6, reflecting increasingly restric-
tiveness of regulatory provisions for competition. These data are then aggregated into 
low level indicators by assigning weights to the respective regulatory provisions. Be-
cause the basic data has been normalized, the low level indicators range also between 0 
and 6. At each step up the pyramid, the regulatory domain summarised by the indicators 
becomes broader. Higher level indicators are computed as weighted averages of their 
constituent lower level indicators. Usually, the attribution of lower level indicators to 
each higher level indicator and the weights used in the averaging process are based on 
principal component analysis. For a given regulatory domain, this technique reveals sets 
of lower level indicators that are most associated with different unobserved principal 
components. In most cases, the latter represent subdomains of regulation that have a 
more or less straightforward economic interpretation. Within each principal component, 
lower level indicators are weighted according to the proportion of the cross country 
variance of the component that is explained by them. Indicators that have the largest 
variation across countries are assigned with the largest weights (Nicoletti, Scarpetta and 
Boylaud, 1999). 
As a serious drawback, the indicator is available just for two years, 1998 and 2003. 
Therefore, in its present stage, the PMR is only suited for cross section analysis. A way 
to extend the PMR is to look at sectoral information. On the industrial level the regula-
tory reform indicators show provisions with respect to public ownership, entrance barri-
ers to firms and market structures for seven non-manufacturing sectors, including tele-
communication, electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger transport and road freight. See 
Conway and Nicoletti (2006) for a detailed description of the sectoral indicators. The 
branches covered in REGREF are typically less open for international competition, and 
anti-competitive policies might be more important here. Indicators are reported at the 
annual frequency over the 1975-2003 period. Hence, time series or panel analysis can 
be carried out even on the sectoral level. The simple average of the sectoral indicators is 
used as an aggregated measure to address the overall level of regulation in the non-
manufacturing sector. Compared to the PMR, the range of regulatory provisions cov-
ered by REGREF is narrower. The correlation between the aggregated REGREF meas-
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ure and the PMR is 0.76 in 1998, and it has declined to 0.52 in 2003. However, as de-
regulation in product markets was not on the political agenda before the mid 1980s, the 
correlation might be stronger in an earlier period. 
Sectoral indicators on product market regulation are available for retail trade and certain 
professional services, including legal, accounting, engineering, and architectural profes-
sions for 1996 and 2003, see Conway and Nicoletti (2006). Regulation in retail trade is 
based on price controls, protection of incumbent firms, registration in the commercial 
register, other licenses and permits needed for commercial activity, regulation for large 
outlets and shop opening hours. Regulation in professional services includes licensing 
and educational standards, and restrictions concerning the form of business, prices and 
fees and inter-professional cooperation, among others. Weights of the individual com-
ponents in the indicators have been often determined by means of factor analysis, see 
Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001). 
Last, it is worth mentioning that a new database known as Regulation Impact (RI) indi-
cators is being developed by the OECD (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). This database 
consists in sectoral indicators measuring the ‘knock-on’ effects of regulation in non-
manufacturing sectors on all sectors of the economy. The estimation procedure com-
bines information about the extent of anti-competitive regulation in non-manufacturing 
sectors and the importance of these sectors as suppliers of intermediate inputs. The in-
formation in the RI database will cover the period 1975-2003 for 36 ISIC rev 3 sectors 
in 21 OECD countries. 
Data on labour market institutions refer to the overall economy and include the strength 
of employment protection legislation, the structure of the wage bargaining process, 
measures in the tax and transfer system, and active labour market policies, see the 
OECD (2004) employment outlook. The indicators are summarized in table 2. Em-
ployment protection legislation is considered for both regular and temporary working 
contracts. This is of particular importance, as deregulations in recent years have cen-
tered on the facilitation of fixed term contracts, while protection of regular employment 
often did not change at all (Young, 2003). These reforms have reinforced duality trends 
in labour markets. For example, high firing costs of permanent contracts might have 
raised the incentives for employers to use temporary jobs in sequence rather than con-
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verting them to regular jobs. As a consequence, many workers go through several un-
employment spells before they get a regular job. Some other aspects, such as the impor-
tance of labour court decisions for the practice of employment protection have not been 
included so far. 
 
Table 2: OECD Indicators on labour market regulation 
Employment protection legislation  Protection on permanent and temporary 
working contracts 
Measures describing the wage bargaining 
system 
Trade union densities, coverage of wages 
bargained by unions wages, coordination 
and centralization of wage negotiations 
Tax and transfer system  Unemployment benefits, gap between net 
and gross wages and salaries (tax wedge) 
Active labour market policies  Public employment services and admini-
stration, labour market training, youth and 
early retirement measures, subsidised em-
ployment, measures for the disabled 
 
The institutional framework for wage negotiations consists of trade union densities, the 
coverage of wages bargained by unions, and the degree of coordination and centraliza-
tion at which bargaining actually takes place. The tax and transfer system is considered 
in terms of the benefits available to the unemployed and the tax wedge on labour in-
come. As far as active labour market policies are concerned, public employment ser-
vices, labour market training and youth and early retirement measures are distinguished, 
as these strategies might have different impacts. 
Many labour market institutions, including employment protection legislation for both 
regular and temporary working contracts, bargaining coordination and bargaining cen-
tralization, are measured on a rank scale where higher numbers refer to stronger regula-
tion. For example, bargaining coordination is scaled in the [1;5] interval, where 1 is 
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bargaining at the individual firm level, with no coordination by higher-level associa-
tions, and 5 is coordination by top-level confederations of unions and employers' asso-
ciations where even the government can impose a wage freeze. 
Other variables are quantitative. Trade union densities show the share of workers organ-
ized in unions. The rate of workers governed by unionized contracts is measured by 
bargaining coverage. There might be large differences within a country, for example in 
France. While union densities are low, the percentage of wages subject to union bar-
gaining is very high. Benefit replacement rates are obtained as a percentage of earnings 
before tax, averaged over family types. The tax wedge refers to the sum of the rates of 
employment taxes, social contributions and indirect taxes. The categories of active la-
bour market policies, like public employment services and labour market training are 
expressed as expenditure shares in nominal GDP. 
Often, the institutional data are not available at the annual frequency. In fact, the OECD 
(2004, 2005) reports five-yearly or ten-yearly data for employment protection legisla-
tion, bargaining coverage, coordination and centralization. An additional problem is that 
the definition for employment protection has changed over time. The new indicator is 
available not before the end of the 1990s. Compared to the older measure, it provides a 
more elaborated view of the various dimensions of job protection. It is based on 18 sub-
measures, including notification procedures, trial periods, rules for severance pay and 
regulations on both individual and collective dismissals, among others. In these cases, 
the OECD (2004, 2005) database has to be extended to match the annual frequency of 
macroeconomic series. Intermediate values for employment protection of regular and 
temporary work can be calculated by means of the OECD (2004) table 2.A2.6, in which 
information about the timing of the reforms is provided for the past 20 years. Bargain-
ing variables can be interpolated using the Nickell and Nunziata (2001) database, at 
least in some cases. 
 
Fraser database 
The Fraser Institute publishes the Economic Freedom Index (EFI), see Gwartney and 
Lawson with Gartzke (2005). The EFI measures the degree to which the policies and 
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institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom. Overall, thirty-eight com-
ponents and subcomponents are used to construct the EFI. In particular, the degree of 
economic freedom in measured in five key areas: size of government, legal structure 
and protection of property rights, access to sound money, international exchange and 
regulation. All variables are ranged from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating the lowest and 10 
indicating the highest level of economic freedom. Data are reported on an annual base 
from 2001 to 2003. From 1970 to 2000, the series are available only on a five-year-
frequency. To match with the annual frequency of macroeconomic variables, the Fraser 
series need to be interpolated. Concerning the areas of regulation, fifteen variables de-
scribe the institutional framework in the economy for the subcomponents of credit, la-
bour and product market regulations, see table 3. 
Table 3: Institutional series in the Fraser database 
Credit market regulation  Ownership of banks, competition between 
domestic and foreign banks, extension of 
credit, degrees of interest rate control 
Labour market regulation  Minimum  wage, hiring and firing prac-
tices, centralization of collective bargain-
ing, unemployment benefits, use of con-
scripts to obtain military personnel 
Product market (business) regulation  Price controls, administrative and other 
conditions to start a new business, time 
spend with government bureaucracy, ir-
regular payments due to fees, licenses etc 
 
It should be noted that individual series are often not available over the entire observa-
tion period. In particular, indicators for product market regulation are reported only for 
a short time span (1995-2003). The other problem is that composite indicators of credit, 
labour and product market are not easy to interpret over time, as the underlying data has 
changed over the years. Hence, variations in the individual country ratings may not im-
ply a change in the degree of regulation, but rather the fact that some components of the 
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index are missing in some years and in others not. For example, a composite indicator 
for labour market regulation is reported since 1970. However, some of its present ingre-
dients were not considered before 1990. Only the EFI has been computed backwards in 
a consistent way as a chain-linked version. 
 
LABREF database 
The LABREF labour market reforms database has been published by the EU Commis-
sion (2005). It is organized around nine broad fields of policy measures, which are 
likely to have an impact on the performance of national labour markets: labour taxation, 
unemployment and welfare related benefits, active labour market policy measures, job 
protection, including disability and the availability of early retirement schemes, pension 
systems, wage bargaining, working time organization, immigration and mobility. Over-
all, 37 subcomponents are provided to make the policy fields operational, and 13 de-
scriptive features are used to characterize the indicators in more detail, for example the 
year of policy adoption, involvement of social partners, and expected budgetary costs 
for the government. Currently, the LABREF database covers the 25 EU countries and 
only the year 2004. Clearly, time series or panel analysis requires the inclusion of dif-
ferent periods. Some backdating is foreseen over the course of 2006, up to 1996 (2000) 
for the old (new) EU members. However, even then, the time span included might be 
too short to study the adjustment of the economy in response to structural reforms. For 
the time being, the LABREF information appears to be more valuable to improve the 
OECD (2004) measures. 
 
MICREF database 
Currently, the EU Commission is preparing a new database related to structural reforms 
in product markets (MICREF). It is organized around three broad fields: openness and 
competition in product markets, business environment and entrepreneurship in product 
markets and reforms promoting a knowledge based economy. Indicators related to 
openness and competition in product markets provide information about market integra-
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tion and competition policy at a macroeconomic level and sector specific regulations for 
telecommunications, postal services, gas, electricity, water, air transportation, railways, 
public local transport, professional services, wholesale and retail trade and others. 
Indicators related to business environment and entrepreneurship provide information 
about the start-up conditions (one-stop contact points, costs for setting up a business, 
minimum start-up requirements and bankruptcy laws) and about the efficiency of the 
legal system, administrative regulations (i.e., E-government), business taxation, busi-
ness support services (training for entrepreneurship and market exploration) and the 
transfer of ownership. Finally, indicators related to the knowledge based economy pro-
vide information about public and private R&D and education. Although the informa-
tion embedded in MICREF is clearly suited for the analysis of the impact of structural 
reforms, the main disadvantage is that only some of these indicators are measured on a 
quantitative scale. 
 
Nickell and Nunziata (2001, 2003) database 
Nickell and Nunziata (2001) have constructed data on labour market institutions until 
1995, and Nickell (2003) has provided an update covering a more recent period. Data 
refer to employment protection legislation, union density, bargaining coverage and co-
ordination, the tax wedge and unemployment benefits averaged over different family 
types and duration of transfers. The series are available for OECD countries since 1960. 
Therefore, the time span is much longer than in concurrent databases. Nevertheless, the 
low growth and high unemployment experience is a problem for the EU economy not 
before the 1980s, and the progress made by earlier information should not be over-
stressed. 
The variables are reported on an annual base. In some cases (employment protection 
legislation, bargaining variables), the data have been linearly interpolated to arrive at 
this frequency. Given that the database is not supported any longer, its most important 
use refers to the possible extension of the OECD (2004) measures. In particular, the 
Nickell and Nunziata (2001, 2003) database can be employed to have an assessment of 
an earlier period, especially in order to test for structural breaks in the relationship be-
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tween institutions and macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, a robustness check for 
the evidence based on OECD (2004) data is provided. 
 
Other sources 
Institutional data are also available from a number of other sources. For example, the 
CESifo Institute provides information on regulatory systems as well as their economic 
effects. The indicators cover regulations for example in the financial and labour market, 
education, the social security system, public finance, and natural resources. In addition, 
databases from the International Labour Organization (ILO), the European Industrial 
Relations Observatory (EIRO), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD), Eurostat, the Observatory of European SMEs and the Worldbank can be 
exploited. 
Especially, the EBRD provides information on the scope and pace of structural reforms 
with regard to the transformation process in the Central and Eastern European econo-
mies. As some of these countries have already joined the EU and will join the euro area 
in later stages, the EBRD database is of particular interest to study the process of con-
vergence. Eurostat reports several structural indicators designed to assess the level of 
achievement of the main strategic goals in the Lisbon strategy. Economic reform indica-
tors are divided into indexes of market integration and market efficiency. Among others, 
the variables refer to the share of total state aid in GDP, energy prices, price conver-
gence in the internal market, market shares of incumbent firms, public procurement and 
business demography, like birth and death rates of enterprises. These measures are re-
ported at the macroeconomic level for an annual frequency. Most of them are available 
since the mid 1990s. The ENSR survey from the Observatory of European SMEs has 
information about the strength of the administrative burden especially for small and 
medium sized enterprises. The Worldbank has presented presents six governance indi-
cators, where one is referred to regulatory quality. It measures the incidence of market 
unfriendly policies and perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in 
the area of business development. The index is measured in units in the interval [-2.5, 
2.5], where higher values correspond to better governance outcomes regarding the time 
and costs of the administrative burden. 
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For the time being, there is no commonly agreed reform indicator. However, the OECD 
(2004, 2005a) together with the MICREF database seem to provide the most compre-
hensive databases on product and labour market institutions and structural reforms. 
Nevertheless, significant gaps are pronounced even in these datasets, and missing values 
need to be interpolated. This could be achieved by means of information taken from 
other sources in order to match the annual frequency of macroeconomic time series. 
While these indicators should be preferred in general, the Nickell and Nunziata (2001, 
2003) and Fraser dataset can be exploited to extent the former information. If similar 
variables are available from different sources, the correlation of these measures in a 
base year can justify a merging of information. In this sense, a longer time span of 
structural reforms data can be constructed by using the Fraser and Nickell and Nunziata 
(2001, 2003) dataset. It should be noted, however, that these measures only allow in-
sights with regard to the direction, not to the size of the institutional impact, as many 
regulation indicators are rank scaled. Consequently, no results can be obtained regard-
ing the required strength of structural reforms. 
Quantitative indicators can be employed in some cases as a proxy for the regulation 
measure. For example, important elements of the administrative burden in the economy 
might be expressed as number of days necessary to start a new business, or in terms of 
the working time needed to fulfil bureaucratic requirements. The involvement of the 
state in the economy can be measured as a share of government consumption and in-
vestment in GDP etc. Other indicators are already available on a quantitative base, such 
as trade union densities, unemployment benefits, active labour market policies or terti-
ary education as a proxy for human capital. 
As an alternative to the indicators reported by various sources, model based indicators 
can be developed (see for example Fabiani and Rodriguez-Palenzuela, 2001). VAR 
models can serve as a tool to investigate the response of output after structural shocks 
on productivity, labour supply or demand. The cumulated impulse responses might be 
interpreted as a measure of persistence in the economy, and can be considered for both 
the short and long run. The responses can be computed for different periods of time, and 
so, some insights into the change of persistence can be obtained. 
 






Typology of econometric methods 
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In the second part of the report, a typology of different econometric approaches is de-
veloped. The abilities of the different methods to examine the institutional impact are 
discussed. 
Different approaches have been proposed to investigate the impact of structural reforms. 
One classification of these approaches is related to the level of the analysis. Broadly, 
micro- and macroeconometric methods can be distinguished. Micromodels are based on 
data on individual economic agents, like households and firms. Often attention is paid to 
variables such as incomes, expenditures or profits, innovation decisions or firm demo-
graphics, such as entries and exits. If the reform acts positively on the microlevel, it is 
also expected to improve the macroeconomic record. Microlevel evidence can be aggre-
gated to get sectoral or economy wide effects. Although the report focuses on mac-
roeconometric models, annex 1 provides some basic overview of microsimulation mod-
els. 
On the macroeconomic side, two classes of models can be distinguished: macroecono-
metric and general equilibrium models. The main asset of macroeconometric models is 
that they are empirically underpinned. The bulk of behavioural equations are estimated 
using elaborated econometric methods. Provided that the estimation of certain parame-
ters turns out to be difficult, calibration techniques are also employed, but normally as 
an exception. As the models are usually large scaled, sectoral structures are wiped out 
rather often, and agents, namely private households, firms, and the government are as-
sumed to be homogeneous. A higher degree of aggregation simplifies the model struc-
ture, facilitates its solution and helps in interpreting and understanding the results, as the 
black box phenomenon will become less important. If the models are considered also to 
forecast the course of the economy, the requirement of sufficient empirical fit may 
dominate the strength of the microeconomic foundation of the behavioural equations. 
Hence, the simulation evidence based on these models might be inconsistent with opti-
mizing individuals, as the behavioural equations might be subject to the Lucas critique 
of policy dependent parameters. 
General equilibrium models are based on optimization behaviour of agents. As they put 
higher weight on the theoretical foundation and internal consistency, they seem to be 
more robust against the Lucas critique. Producers maximize individual profits and con-
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sumers their utilities, respectively. Depending on the specific approach, the economy 
can be also disaggregated into sectors, where demand and supply on labour, products 
and financial markets are based on the decisions of heterogeneous agents. This is seri-
ously important, as effects of structural reforms can vary substantially across sectors, 
incomes or labour market segments. Thus, some models are able to integrate microlevel 
mechanisms and institutional features into a consistent macroeconomic framework and 
allow for various spillovers and feedback mechanisms between the markets of the econ-
omy. Partial equilibrium models can be seen as a variant, as they focus on the analysis 
of specific sectors or markets. As Friedman and Levinsohn (2002) have pointed out, 
they can offer a handy rapid response and have the advantage of being easier to under-
stand. In this sense, partial models can provide a high degree of disaggregation and de-
tailed representation of the specific sectors. Their most important drawback is the ne-
glection of feedbacks to other sectors. 
General equilibrium models can be separated into CGE (computable general equilib-
rium) and DSGE (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) models. Both approaches can 
be built for different countries or certain country blocks, respectively. Closed form 
economy models can be extended to a multi-country setting to investigate aspects of 
international interdependencies. By comparing the outcomes of the national and interna-
tional approaches, insights into possible national impediments to the reform process 
could be obtained. 
Basically, two alternative strategies are available to discuss the impact of structural re-
forms by employing CGE and DSGE environments. First, existing models could be 
adapted to include certain policy options. Furthermore, the impact of structural reforms 
could be directly expressed in terms of the model variables. For example, a reduction in 
the administrative burden of firms might lead to a fall in labour costs, as less bureau-
cratic effort is required. Policies influencing the duration of unemployment benefits or 
their coverage can be translated into a change in the unemployment benefits paid in the 
economy which can be used as an input for the model. 
The other strategy is to construct satellite models to provide these linkages. A satellite 
model could be a single equation, but also a multiequation framework. The impact of 
structural reforms is studied in advance for predefined transmission channels and then 
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plugged into the larger model structure. While the overall CGE or DSGE can be seen as 
a core model, satellite models provide an extension to study the impact of certain struc-
tural reforms. As a main advantage, this indirect strategy can be constructed relatively 
fast. No change in the core specification is required, and there is no need for a further 
time consuming review of the relationships and stability analysis. The outcome of a 
satellite model leads to reactions of the variables in the core model, but not vice versa. 
Hence, the macroeconomic outcome is assumed to have no feedback on the implemen-
tation of structural reforms, and causality works only in one direction. 
Nevertheless, the bulk of the empirical literature has investigated the impact of struc-
tural reforms on the macroeconomic performance by means of single equation analysis. 
Hence, the typology starts with these kinds of models, which can be also employed as 
satellites. Then, the more elaborated techniques are discussed. 
 
5  Single equation approach 
In single equations, the direct impact of institutional measures is examined by regres-
sion analysis. The regressors are the regulation indicators presented earlier in the report. 
The endogenous variable might describe the macroeconomic record in terms of produc-
tivity, output or employment or intermediate variables which are transmitters to eco-
nomic growth, such as total factor productivity (TFP). Furthermore, parameters of inter-
est can serve as endogenous, such as substitution elasticities between different product 
markets or elasticities of labour demand and supply. It should be noted that, in any case, 
the regressors are only rank-scaled. Consequently, only the direction, but not the size of 
the institutional impact on the endogenous variable can be uncovered. The single equa-
tion approach could be implemented in terms of a cross section, time series, or panel 
econometric model. 
In a cross section analysis, the institutional impact might be interpreted as the average 
effect across individual sectors or countries. As the time series dimension is neglected, 
adjustment processes cannot be studied using these kinds of models. On the other hand, 
time series analysis is often not practicable. As institutions change only gradually over 
time, a serious degrees of freedom problem will arise. In addition, significant gaps in 
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the institutional data question time series results. Therefore, the time series dimension 
should not be seen as an alternative, but rather as an extension to the cross section. In 
fact, panel models are better suited to investigate the institutional impact, as they avoid 
the disadvantages of pure cross sections or time series models. Furthermore, the institu-
tional impact can be separated from sectoral or country specific characteristics, which 
can be treated as fixed effects. Given that institutions change smoothly over time, how-
ever, a multicollinearity problem is apparent, as the institutional impact is partly em-
bedded in the fixed effects, and vice versa. Multicollinearity could be reduced, however, 
if the variables are specified as deviations from cross sectional means, see for example 
Erkel-Rousse and Mirza (2002). In addition, issues concerning the relevance of reform 
packages can hardly be examined in a single equation setup. Interactions between insti-
tutions are usually taken into account by product terms of the respective regressors, but 
the capabilities of this approach to discuss the impacts of a sequence of reforms tends to 
be rather limited. 
One and two step strategies can be distinguished. By means of a one step strategy, the 
institutional effect is estimated in a direct way, as the variables describing the macro-
economic record (GDP growth rates, unemployment rates) are endogenous. Some of the 
regressors need to be proxied by appropriate instruments to avoid possible endogeneity 
bias. For example, expenditures on active labour market policies are lower if the em-
ployment performance could be enhanced. Furthermore, as a response to higher unem-
ployment, protection of existing jobs could be reduced. The validity of instruments can 
be justified by Sargan-type tests of overidentifying restrictions. Lagged regressors are 
possible candidates for the choice of instruments. 
A main difficulty in the interpretation of the results arises in the one step models, as 
they do not relate reforms to measures of market competition. Thus, the channels by 
which reforms may affect productivity growth are unclear. The models do not show that 
the reforms have led to an increase in competition, or how these factors affect economic 
growth. This can be achieved using a two step strategy. 
Under a two step framework, intermediate variables are used as transmitters of the insti-
tutional impact, such as mark ups to wages and prices, TFP or entries and exit rates of 
firms in different markets. As structural reforms will generally enhance competition and 
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improve the conditions on the supply side of the economy, the impact on the intermedi-
ate variables is often studied in advance. Then the final outcome attributed to the re-
forms is equal to the change in the macroeconomic performance, which is linked to the 
variation in the mark up or the TFP rate induced by the reforms. 
It should be noted, however, that the two step strategy reveals unbiased estimates only if 
other impacts are negligible. In particular, the approach focuses on the indirect effect 
which is transmitted through the chosen variables. The indirect effect does not capture 
the overall impact, if direct channels are at work. The relevance of the latter can be in-
vestigated by the Sargan type tests. The two step strategy will usually fail to deliver 
unbiased estimates, if direct effects cannot be excluded. Even the indirect effects are 
estimated with bias, if the effects are correlated. From an economic point of view, direct 
impacts may represent channels, which are important in reality. But alternatively, the 
direct effects can be significant because of neglected structural breaks in the relationship 
or nonlinearities between the regulation indicators and the intermediate variable. Inter-
actions between the process through which the reforms affect the intermediate variables 
and the process through which the intermediate variables affect the macroeconomic 
performance deserve a careful analysis. Single equations have been employed rather 
often to analyse the impacts of structural reforms. See annex 2 for an overview of the 
most influential contributions in this area. 
As its main asset, the single equation approach is easy to implement. Moreover, institu-
tional variables can be used as regressors. Single equations may be employed to detect 
nonlinearities in the link between reforms and macroeconomic performance. Interac-
tions between institutions and between institutions and macroeconomic variables can be 
included by the products of the respective regressors. The single equation analysis can 
be carried out as a one- or two step strategy. However, only the latter approach leads to 
interpretable results, as it is linked t the transmission channels of structural reforms. As 
a serious drawback, however, the relationships are largely specified ad hoc and subject 
to the Lucas critique of policy dependent parameters. Hence, only insights into the di-
rections of the impacts of past reforms can be provided. 
In sum, single equation analysis should be used in an ex post framework to study the 
impact of past reforms. In an ex ante analysis, the usefulness of the single equation ap-
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proach is rather limited. However, if the behaviour of agents does not change in the re-
sponse to reforms, single equations can provide additional insights into the direction of 
the institutional impact. The methods can be also used as satellite models to the more 
elaborated approaches, like macroeconometric models, CGEs and DSGEs. For example, 
the direction of the institutional impact on crucial elasticities can be estimated by means 
of cross section or panel models, where elasticities in different sectors or countries are 
endogenous. 
 
6  Computable general equilibrium models (CGEs) 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are heavily built on microeconomic 
theory and theoretical coherence. The behavioural equations are determined by micro-
economic principles. On the demand side, consumers maximize utilities subject to their 
intertemporal budget constraint, as defined by their initial endowments. On the supply 
side, firms maximize profits, often without affecting factor and output prices. The gov-
ernment levies taxes from private households and firms, and undertakes expenditures, 
like demand for products and transfers. The models have a rigorous theoretical depth, 
but as most parameters are calibrated, they take a liberal view on econometric and sta-
tistical methodology. On the one hand, this is an advantage, because data requirements 
are of limited interest. On the other hand, there is a lack of empirical underpinning, and 
results can be largely driven by model assumptions. CGE models avoid the Lucas cri-
tique, as there are less problems with the expectations in the estimated parameters used 
(Lucas, 1976). However, there is a prize to be paid for this, as the equations will be less 
empirically founded. 
The models are calibrated using a dataset from a base year, where the economy is in the 
long run equilibrium, by assumption. Once correctly specified, the model is able to rep-
licate the initial benchmark situation as its equilibrium, see Dawkins, Srinivasann and 
Whalley (2001). The calibration of parameter values is straightforward, as they appear 
to be the solutions from the underlying equations, once the data are plugged into the 
relationships. However, there are no degrees of freedom left in this procedure, and stan-
dard errors cannot be obtained. Therefore, the range of uncertainty around the point 
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estimates is not clear at all. Furthermore, some of the parameters might be exogenous to 
the model, that is, they cannot be revealed from the equations embedded so far. These 
parameters can be calibrated using evidence reported in the literature. In addition, the 
functional forms of the utility and production equations have to be specified on a priori 
grounds. 
Most CGE models refer to the neoclassical framework of perfect competition. But, im-
perfections can be also incorporated in the analysis, and may be justified by rigidities of 
wages and prices and monopolistic behaviour of firms. In this sense, the equilibrium 
conditions ensure the internal consistency of the models, i.e. the consistency of the indi-
vidual plans which are summarized in a social accounting matrix (SAM). The SAM is a 
representation of the flows of goods and payments between the model actors and can be 
applied for the different levels of disaggregation. The static nature of many CGE models 
only allows an investigation of the long term impacts of structural reforms. Some mod-
els have a recursive dynamic structure, i.e. they solve a sequence of subsequent static 
equilibria which are connected through stock accumulation. But, as the models are in 
equilibrium at each point in time, these dynamics are largely inappropriate to study ad-
justment processes or sequences of structural reforms. 
To implement regulation policies in a CGE framework, appropriate strategies depend on 
the topic of interest. As an alternative to the institutional indicators, the impact of struc-
tural reforms can be expressed in terms of model variables. For example, the adminis-
trative burden has been translated into costs of firms in advance (Gelauff and Lejour, 
2006a). Wages need to be paid for workers that are hired to supervise compliance with 
regulations and provide the government with information. Reducing the administrative 
burden would imply that some of these workers can contribute directly to production, 
thereby increasing labour efficiency. Given a mean labour income share, a 25 percent 
decrease in the administrative burden will increase the volume of GDP by 1.4 percent in 
the new steady state. 
The strength of CGE models is twofold: first, the microeconomic level is based on op-
timization behaviour of private households, firms and the government, and the resulting 
macroeconomic outcome is coherent with this foundation because of the SAM. Second, 
the models can provide a much disaggregated view of the economy, as data require-
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ments are not very important. A bulk of sectors can be distinguished, where feedbacks 
and spillovers between them may be taken into account. This is of particular relevance, 
as policy measures might have different impacts across sectors. For example, higher 
R&D spending affect high technology sectors differently than services sectors. In addi-
tion, distributional effects can be studied by the CGE approach. The plea for diversifica-
tion can be repeated at any stage of the modelling building process. The limits depend 
only on analytical tractability and data. 
CGEs have also serious drawbacks. Most important, either the entire models or signifi-
cant parts are not empirically underpinned. The choice of the base year is rather crucial, 
as stochastic anomalies might be present in that period and will have a strong impact on 
the simulation results. As a consequence, structural reforms are endangered to be exam-
ined in a non-representative framework, and policy conclusions will be seriously biased. 
As the models are in equilibrium at each point in time, recursive dynamics are not well 
suited to investigate adjustment processes or sequences of structural reforms. Sensitivity 
analysis is also of central importance, as a minor change in the parameter values might 
have a large impact on the results. 
 
7 Partial  equilibrium  models 
One caveat with CGE models is that they can become quite complex, thereby making it 
hard to determine whether the results are robust. Instead, they can be largely driven by 
data or certain modelling assumptions. Especially CGEs are very assumption-intensive, 
and these types of models bear a greater burden in ensuring that results are robust to 
variation in these assumptions. Of course, the payoff from this analysis is that it offers 
the prospects of being able to explore a wider range of issues that are critical for poli-
cymakers within a consistent theoretical framework. 
Partial equilibrium (PE) models are also based on optimization behaviour, and are often 
employed to describe processes in specific economic sectors. Their attraction is the de-
tail that can be achieved in the modelling exercise. The effects of policy actions are ex-
amined only in the directly affected markets. This analysis ignores spillovers from or 
into other sectors or assumes that the sector under study is very small and has only little 
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impact on the rest of the economy. In contrast, linkages between sectors are acknowl-
edged in CGE models. 
PE models are often structured around a supply and demand block, together with trade 
linkages if more than one country is considered. Analysis of supply and demand is built 
upon price effects of alternative policy options. Producer and consumer surplus is taken 
as a measure of the welfare gains of market participants. Consumer surplus is defined as 
the difference between what consumers are willing to pay for a unit of the good and the 
amount consumers actually pay for the product. Producer surplus is defined as the dif-
ference between what producers actually receive when selling a product and the amount 
they would be willing to accept as a minimum for a unit of the good. When considered, 
revenues collected by the government are assumed to be redistributed to other agents in 
the model. In particular, it is either spent on public goods or redistributed to someone in 
the economy, thereby raising the welfare of somebody. PE models are one of the most 
important tools in order to assess the impact of structural reforms in the agriculture sec-
tor, international trade or network liberalisation, such as in the fields of electricity or 
transportation. 
Van Togeren et al. (2000) have given an assessment to the state of modelling in the ag-
ricultural sector, focusing on international trade flows and related issues such as natural 
resources and environment. The aim is to support the model users in finding the most 
appropriate tool for the problem at hand. Van Togeren et al. (2000) identified 18 mod-
els, where half of them are PEs, for example the AGLINK model of the OECD, and the 
FAO world model. 
Often, agricultural PEs have been designed as multicountry models and are useful for 
the analysis of tariffs or other impediments to trade. If trade policies do not lead to no-
ticeable price shifts in other sectors, the results obtained with PE models would almost 
not differ from CGEs. In industrial countries, with small agricultural shares, direct link-
ages may not be very strong. But, indirect linkages need to be considered as well. These 
effects run through markets for natural resources, especially land, and could refer to 
sectors that are closely related to agriculture, such as producers of fertilisers or specific 
machinery, among others. The higher the weight of these sectors in the economy, the 
less reliable is the evidence based on PE models. 
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In the analysis of international trade, PE models are used to study trade liberalization 
policy measures, proxied by tariffs and tariff-rate equivalents of standards and technical 
regulations and associated welfare changes, see Maskus, Wilson and Otsuki (2000). 
Tariff-rate equivalents are price premia that exporters must overcome in addition to tar-
iffs. As in CGE models, demand and supply elasticities are usually calibrated from ex-
isting studies and have not been estimated. The OECD (2003b) has provided a recent 
survey of models applied to international trade. The US International Trade Commis-
sion uses COMPAS, which is a multi-country, single sector, imperfect substitution, per-
fect competition model based on an Armington specification, where products are distin-
guished by the country of origin. 
PE models are also used in the context of network liberalisation such as postal services, 
electricity or transport. For postal services, Scott, Finn and Merrick (1999) have devel-
oped PE models covering liberalisation of direct mail, cross-border mail, mail above 
certain weight or price thresholds, and access for competitors to the network of the uni-
versal service provider in each EU member state. These models can provide approxima-
tions of the effect of liberalisation on the profitability of European postal services and 
employment levels. Regarding the electricity sector, Pepermans (2003) has focused on 
the impact of the choice of the regulation mechanism on the budget of the municipali-
ties and on the end-user prices for electricity. 
Furthermore, reforms in transports have been studied by PE models, for example by 
TREMOVE. This tool has been developed in the second European Auto-Oil Programme 
(AOPII) for the assessment to the effects of a wide range of policy instruments applica-
ble to local, regional and European transport markets. TREMOVE is built in the GAMS 
software, that allows simulating consumer behaviour with regard to the choice of trans-
port modes and vehicle types, to consider how these choices are affected by the intro-
duction of policy measures, and to estimate what effect these policy measures will have 
on pollutant emissions and overall welfare. The model takes into account a large num-
ber of transport modes, and determines the demand for each of them and emissions from 
road transport by taking into account interactions between the various transport options. 
Models based on similar principles are STREAMS and its follow-up SCENES, which 
shared some of the characteristics of TREMOVE. However, the latter has the advantage 
of being linked to a macroeconometric model (E3ME). The joint use of these two mod-
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els (SCENES and E3ME) permits to consider global economic effects (see Köhler, 
2005). 
The PE approach has the advantage to specialize on certain standards and regulations. 
As PE models are highly focused on one sector, the models can be implemented faster 
and are easier to maintain than CGEs. The models are mainly suited to study industry 
specific reforms. But, they do not capture spillovers to other sectors, and the neglecting 
of these linkages might seriously bias the results. 
 
8 Macroeconometric  and DSGE models 
Macroeconometric models are based on the system of national accounts and are able to 
study the impact of a wide range of policy measures. In contrast to the CGE models, the 
equations are empirically validated. Provided that central banks, government and supra-
governmental organisations have a big stake in answering correctly what their effects on 
the economy are, it is not surprising that usually all these institutions have based their 
decisions on large in-house-built macroeconometric models. The development of these 
models is influenced by advances in the academic literature. New theoretical paradigms 
have been adopted usually with some lag, however, not before the theoretical concepts 
had been refined up to the point to fit the data quite well (see Bayoumi, 2004). An ex-
ample is the implementation of the rational expectations framework into large mac-
roeconometric frameworks in the early 1990s. 
The institutions that have developed expertise in policy analysis have usually kept track 
of each other’s work. As a consequence, the models do not differ very much from each 
other. In particular, similar methodologies, simulation and solution techniques are ap-
plied. Policy oriented models are much larger than the ones discussed in the literature. 
The models usually comprise hundreds of equations, and international trade linkages 
have been explicitly specified. These models ensure a coherent framework for analysing 
inter-linkages between variables and countries. However, their weakness is that it is 
difficult to catch longer run phenomena, since the equations on which they are based are 
linked to a given period of time. 
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Aggregated labour, product, and financial markets are considered. In order to reduce the 
complexity of the often large scaled models, agents are assumed to be homogeneous. 
Thus, heterogeneity is usually neglected across economic sectors, but not across differ-
ent countries. On the supply side, potential output and factor demand behaviour are ex-
plained. Potential output results from a CES or Cobb Douglas type production function 
with labour, capital, technological progress and eventually energy as input factors. Fac-
tor demand equations are derived from profit maximisation of firms. In general technol-
ogy is assumed to be exogenous, although much of the more recent analysis of conver-
gence and the new growth literature has emphasized the important role of endogenous 
effects linked to human capital growth. 
Macroeconometric models share a similar structure on the demand side which is based 
upon the components of GDP, like consumption, investment and foreign trade. Because 
of sluggish adjustment of wages and prices, output and employment are driven by the 
demand side conditions in the short run. Disequilibria, represented by the unemploy-
ment or output gap, are important variables to explain the short-run adjustment of wages 
and prices. In the long run, wage behaviour is modelled to ensure the existence of a ver-
tical Phillips curve. Prices are determined as mark up over unit labour costs, while the 
money stock often serves as a nominal anchor to the system. The money-price relation-
ship establishes an independent long run relationship especially in the wage-price set-
ting block, and can contribute to a higher stability of the overall model. Monetary policy 
acts via a Taylor rule, where the inflation and output gap have often similar weights. 
Inflationary developments generate responses of the interest rates. Thus, aggregate de-
mand will adjust to the supply side in the long run. 
The behavioural equations are generally specified in an error correction framework. Due 
to nominal rigidities, model builders have proceeded by separating estimation into two 
steps. First, the long-run properties of the models are specified in most cases according 
to neoclassical theory. Long run parameters, governing the cointegrating relationships 
of the variables of interest, are set either by calibration or regression techniques. The 
second stage is the short run adjustment to the steady state, where lag structures are of-
ten incorporated by empirical arguments. Nevertheless, dynamic effects could also oc-
cur within the optimization framework, for example due to the presence of adjustment 
costs for investment, habit formation and labour hoarding. 
  46 
Another common feature of many macroeconometric models is that they are backward-
looking. Expectations of agents are treated implicitly by the inclusion of lags of the re-
spective variables. For example, adaptive expectations are consistent with this strategy. 
An alternative option is the use of VAR expectations which correspond to the forecasts 
of a small vector autoregressive (VAR) model comprising a few key time series. The 
use of these kinds of expectations results from the fact that the models are designed not 
only for policy simulation, but also for forecasting purposes. Recent examples include 
the area wide model of the ECB (Fagan, Henry and Mestre, 2005), the Oxford Eco-
nomic Forecasting (OEF) model or NiGEM from the NIESR, London (Barrell, Dury 
and Holland, 2001). In case of the financial variables like interest and exchange rates, 
however, forward looking behaviour is often assumed. 
If expectations are not formed consistently with respect to the long run solution of the 
entire model, it can impossible to differentiate between the effects of anticipated and 
unanticipated policy changes on some of the variables. These models fit the data quite 
well, but are not really tied to microeconomic behaviour. Hence, they cannot account 
for policy induced shifts in the parameters (Lucas, 1976). Moreover, if forecasting mod-
els like VARs are specified in a reduced form framework to improve the empirical fit, 
elasticities of interest can hardly be identified. 
Generally, different tools for forecasting and simulation should be preferred in the 
analysis, although this strategy might require additional resources. Rigorously model-
building upon optimizing behaviour of agents has led to the development of dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) approaches. The main difference to the more 
traditional Keynesian style macroeconometric models is that both the parameters and 
the shocks to the structural equations are related to deeper structural parameters describ-
ing preferences of households and technological and institutional constraints. The mi-
crofoundation of the models has three key advantages. First, it provides a sound theo-
retical structure of the model that is being estimated. Second, the reduced-form parame-
ters are related to deeper structural parameters. The latter are less likely to change in 
response to a change in the policy regime, implying that the Lucas critique will lose its 
relevance. Thus DSGEs might be more suited for policy analysis. Third, the specifica-
tion of individual decision’s behaviour can be used to examine welfare relevant ques-
tions. As DSGE models are derived from optimization behaviour of agents, one can 
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evaluate alternative policies in terms of their effects on consumer welfare. Since DSGEs 
have been extended to a multicountry setting especially by the work of Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1995) and by advances in solution algorithms, their development has exploded 
in the last years, see Lane (2001) for a survey. 
Parameters are often calibrated or estimated using maximum likelihood techniques or 
the Bayesian counterparts of them, see for example Smets and Wouters (2003). Com-
pared to the calibration approach, the likelihood principle has its advantage. The tech-
niques provide a full characterization of the observed data series. By introducing richer 
dynamics to the model, through a number of exogenous shocks, the model can be fitted 
to the data quite well, in terms of contemporaneous correlations, serial correlation and 
cross-covariances structures. Bayesian techniques combine the likelihood function with 
prior information stemming from different empirical studies, thus providing a link to the 
calibration literature. Initial views on parameter values and their relevance are specified 
in advance. Afterwards, these priors are combined with the limited evidence contained 
in the data to arrive at the final estimates. While early DSGE variants are largely an-
chored in the neoclassical framework, new approaches incorporate nominal rigidities on 
nominal wages and prices as well. 
By means of a DSGE for the Finnish economy, Kilponen and Ripatti (2005) have inves-
tigated the quantitative effects of an increase in competition in both product and labour 
markets. Higher competition is implemented by a decrease in the mark up to wages and 
prices, while the decline is specified to happen gradually. In particular, 80 percent of the 
shock is passed within 5 years, which corresponds to the time schedule of the Lisbon 
strategy. According to the simulation results, welfare, consumption, investment, produc-
tion and employment will increase substantially, while prices are lower in the long-run. 
There is, however, an initial slump in consumption due to the wealth effect of the con-
tracted profits. Furthermore, lower inflation implies a rise in the real interest rate. In the 
long run equilibrium, the improved performance of the economy gives room to decrease 
tax and social contribution rates, while leaving the long-run public debt to GDP ratio 
unchanged. 
To summarize, macroeconometric models are based on national account systems. The 
equations are empirically validated, and usually estimated in an error correction form. 
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As the short run dynamics can be distinguished from the long run equilibrium, adjust-
ment processes in response to structural reforms can be investigated by using these 
methods. However, the models are often used both for forecasting and simulation pur-
poses. As the empirical fit might dominate the specification of the model, the relation-
ships can be subject to the Lucas (1976) critique. In this sense, macroeconometric mod-
els are better suited for the ex post analysis of past reforms than for the ex ante analysis 
of future reforms. DSGE models can be interpreted as an appropriate way to overcome 
these deficits, as they are strongly embedded in a microeconomic optimization frame-
work. As the parameters are often calibrated, the results can be also driven by model 
assumptions. As in the CGE setup, the irrelevance of the Lucas critique has to be tested 
in advance. Because of numerical problems in the solving process, the level of disag-
gregation is much lower than in the CGE framework. At the present stage of model de-
velopment, DSGEs seem to be better suited to investigate the long run impacts of alter-
native policy strategies, see Bayoumi (2004). Thus, Keynesian style macroeconometric 
models may also serve as a complement to provide some insights al least into the short 
run dynamics of structural reforms. 
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Annex 1: Microsimulation models 
The basic advantage of microeconomic models is that heterogeneities between individu-
als are considered. Microsimulation techniques have been used for policy consulting, in 
particular to explore the distributional effects of tax reforms or to assess the impact of 
active labour market policies. The models operate at the level of the individual units, 
such as a person, household, or firm. Within the model each unit is represented by a 
record containing a unique identifier and a set of associated attributes, for example age, 
marital and employment status. Such models simulate large representative populations 
in order to draw conclusions that apply to higher levels of aggregation such as an entire 
country. In particular, a set transition probabilities is applied to the individuals leading 
to simulated changes in state and behaviour. The rules may be deterministic, such as 
changes in tax liability resulting from changes in tax regulations, or stochastic, such as 
chance of dying, marrying, giving birth or moving within a given time period. In either 
case the result is an estimate of the outcomes of applying these rules, possibly over sev-
eral time steps, including both the total overall aggregate change and the distributional 
nature of any change. 
Most models are static, i.e. only the first round effect of policy measures is considered 
regarding its impact on the distribution of income or other resources. As a representa-
tive for the static approach, EUROMOD is a European tax-benefit model designed to 
analyse the effect of tax reforms for the EU economies (Sutherland, 2005). The model 
provides estimates of the distributional impact of changes in the tax and transfer system, 
regarding the specification of policy changes, the application of revenue constraints and 
the reforms taking place at either the national or the EU wide level. Thus, EUROMOD 
is of value both in assessing the consequences of consolidated social policies and in 
understanding how different policies in different countries may contribute to common 
objectives. In dynamic microsimulation models, the population is aged in each round, 
and individual lifepaths are simulated. Individuals are usually allowed to work, get mar-
ried, give birth, divorce, and die. Behavioural responses are incorporated, especially 
labour supply responses, to the incentive structure imposed by the tax and transfer sys-
tem. These approaches are rather complex and only a few of them are available, see for 
example Baekgaard, King and Robinson (1999) and Creedy and Kalb (2005). SESIM is 
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a model developed by the Swedish Ministry of Finance, see Flood, Jansson, Pettersson, 
Pettersson, Sundberg and Westerberg (2005). It is based on information of 100,000 
Swedish citizens and mainly suited to examine the fiscal sustainability of pension sys-
tems. 
The impact of active labour market policies is usually measured as the difference be-
tween the probability of being employed or the wages received by people affected by 
these policies and its counterfactual. Using data on 327,000 vacancies Räisänen (2004) 
finds that the Finnish Public Employment Services (PES) is effective. Filling a vacancy 
with a PES job-seeker is 4.5 times more likely relative to a situation without an assign-
ment. It is important to note that the results cannot be easily compared as individuals 
either participate or not participate in programs, but never both. Solving this evaluation 
problem requires credible estimates of the counterfactual outcome that would have been 
realized if persons made different participation choices (Smith, 2000). Several methods 
have been used in order to estimate the counterfactual, see for example Heckman and 
Vytlacil (2000) and Duran (2004). 
The most relevant limitation of this approach is that indirect effects of the policies are 
often not considered. Indirect effects occur when a program affects persons other than 
its participants. For example, an active labour market program that provides job search 
assistance to the long-term unemployed can increase the speed at which its participants 
gets into work, but might also slow down the return to work of the short-term unem-
ployed (Smith, 2004). Hence, displacement effects may occur, see Calmfors (1994). For 
example, long-term unemployed persons with improved job search skills due to the pro-
gram take jobs that would otherwise have been taken by the short-term unemployed. 
Subsidies to one group of workers can cause employers to substitute them for other 
workers. Calmfors (1994) has also stressed the importance of tax effects, whereby taxes 
needed to finance a program distort the economic choices of both participants and non-
participants. 
Summarising, microsimulation models can be useful in order to take into account indi-
vidual heterogeneity and the possibility of analysing the distributional dynamics to as-
sess the impact of structural reforms. However, they have two weaknesses: the first is 
related to the difficulties to incorporate dynamic specifications, while the second is the 
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absence of feedback from the micro to the macro level. In particular, possible economy-
wide feedback effects of the distributional consequences of a given policy are not taken 
into account. 
 
Annex 2: Results from single equation analysis 
The impact of structural reforms on the macroeconomic performance has been investi-
gated by numerous empirical studies, where the single equation technique is employed 
very often, either in terms of the one or two step approach. Either the analysis is re-
stricted to a relatively homogeneous subset of similar countries or potentially different 
reactions in different sectors are accounted by testing differences in crucial coefficients 
across sectors. To verify the robustness of the estimates to potential measurement error 
and small sample problems, many papers screen regressions for the presence of outliers. 
In this annex, a brief review of the most influential studies is presented. 
Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti and Schiantarelli (2005) have looked at the relationship 
between investment and indicators taken from the OECD regulation database. Nicoletti 
and Scarpetta (2003) have related a large number of structural reforms to multi factor 
productivity (MFP) growth in manufacturing and business services industries. In their 
paper the impact of product market reforms affects MFP convergence across countries 
and industries. Progress in MFP at the technological frontier is assumed to stimulate 
MFP growth in the catching-up countries where the size of the impact increases with the 
distance from the frontier (Scarpetta and Tressel, 2002). Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) 
have highlighted two main effects of reforms in their study: lowering entry barriers and 
state control are associated with faster catch-up to the frontier, where sectors further 
behind the frontier get higher rewards. In addition, the process of privatization stimu-
lates productivity. 
Griffith and Harrison (2004) have used a two step strategy to study the institutional im-
pact. They have investigated the relationship between product market reforms, rents 
(measured by mark-ups of the respective sector) and the macroeconomic performance, 
where the latter is measured by either productivity, output, or employment defined in 
levels and growth rates. Rents are proxied by the level of the mark-up in the price set-
ting behaviour of firms. Generally, reforms that reduce market power will force firms to 
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set prices closer to marginal costs, implying that the mark-up will decrease. The authors 
use the mark-up of price over marginal cost to capture the effects of changes in the 
regulatory regimes over time. The estimation is performed using a two step instrumental 
variable approach in order to solve certain endogeneity issues. First, the mark up is re-
gressed on a vector of time and country and industry varying indicators of product mar-
ket regulation taken from the Fraser database, a measure of the output gap which cap-
tures country specific cyclical factors, country and time fixed effects. Second, the au-
thors estimate the effects of the predicted levels of rents on the demand for input factors, 
labour productivity and TFP. Therefore, each of the measures of macroeconomic per-
formance are regressed upon a function of the mark-up estimated in the first stage, the 
output gap, country and time fixed effects. 
According to the empirical findings, product market reforms that lower tariffs reduce 
administrative price controls or public involvement in production are negatively corre-
lated with the mark-up and increase competition. However, lower mark ups will gener-
ally reduce the macroeconomic performance, which seems to be counterintuitive. In line 
with the theoretical expectation, the between estimator points to a positive relationship 
in the long run. The authors also find evidence for a nonlinear relationship between the 
level of mark ups and levels of R&D and the growth rates of labour productivity and 
TFP. According to their results, product market reforms in different countries can lead 
to different outcomes. This raises the question on whether it is possible to impose a 
common structure across the economies. To verify the results of the two step strategy, 
Griffith and Harrison (2004) compare the evidence with the one that would be obtained 
by a one-step strategy. They present results form regressions of fitted macroeconomic 
outcomes directly on the indicators of product market reforms. Overall, the results sup-
port the main findings from their two step approach, both for the aggregate economy 
and the manufacturing and service sectors. 
Similarly, Cincera and Galgau (2005) estimate the relationship between firm entry and 
exit rates and several indicators of product market reforms and regulations in a first 
stage, and in the second one, they estimate the relationship between the fitted firm entry 
and exit rates and different macroeconomic outcomes, in particular the growth of out-
put, labour productivity, employment, investment in tangible and intangible capitals and 
R&D and physical capital intensities. 
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While most empirical studies have explored the impact of product market reforms, some 
of them also focused on the effects of labour market reforms. For example, Blanchard 
and Wolfers (2000) found support for the interaction hypothesis, namely, that the com-
bination of adverse economic shocks and labour market rigidities is crucial to under-
stand the raise and persistence of unemployment in Europe. Similar results have been 
reported by Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2001). Using data from 17 OECD countries over 
the period 1960-96 and a simple theoretical framework, they investigate the impact of 
institutions on the relative employment of youth, women, and older individuals. They 
regress relative employment and unemployment outcomes on a standard set of labour 
market institutions, aggregate unemployment, and period and country effects. 
Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2001) have found that for both, men and women, more exten-
sive involvement of unions in the wage-setting process significantly decreases the em-
ployment rate of young and older individuals relative to the prime-aged, with no signifi-
cant effects on the relative unemployment of these groups. In contrast, a larger role for 
unions has insignificant effects on male-female employment differentials, but does raise 
female unemployment relative to male unemployment. While shocks or labour market 
institutions in isolation are only modestly relevant, their interplay is the most crucial 
factor to explain why the US shifted from a position of relatively high to relatively low 
unemployment during the past three decades. By comparing the actual outcome with a 
model assuming fixed institutions over time, Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel and Quintini 
(2003) are able to explain half of the unemployment experience by institutional shifts 
over the 1960-1995 period, especially in the tax and transfer system. They regressed the 
unemployment rate on own lags and a number of institutional variables In the IMF 
(2003) study, institutions and interaction terms play a vital role in the evolution of un-
employment in France and Italy, but not in Germany. 
The evidence taken from other studies is not straightforward, see Baker, Glyn, Howell, 
Schmidt (2002) and Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) for recent surveys. Employment protec-
tion seems to have almost no impact on the development of unemployment. Stricter 
protection of jobs increases the long-term unemployment rate, but, possibly because of 
multicollinearity problems, the effect is no longer significant when the overall unem-
ployment rate enters the regressions. OECD (2004) estimates suggest that stricter em-
ployment protection legislation raises employment for the prime age men but lowers 
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employment for young people and women, with the overall effect of a net reduction. 
However, these bivariate associations tend to be weaker or fully absent when multivari-
ate techniques with a broader set of variables are used. The evidence is more robust for 
employment protection tending to increase self-employment and lower turnover rates in 
the labour market. Due to the latter result, fewer individuals become unemployed in 
those countries with stricter protection, but once unemployed, they face a higher risk of 
remaining unemployed for a long period of time. 
Artís, Buscher, Clar, Dreger, Ramos and Suriñach (2005) have looked on the link be-
tween labour market institutions and the reallocation of labour after shocks. Differences 
to other studies are twofold. First, a broader set of labour market variables is examined, 
as both labour demand and wage setting behaviour is taken into account. Second, VAR 
models are considered as an alternative to the single equation regression, where the lat-
ter is based on a structural relation between the variables involved. With the VAR mod-
els, evidence regarding the short and the long run impacts can be obtained. In general, 
reallocation of labour is faster in a more deregulated environment, no matter whether 
structural single equations or VARs are used. Persistent effects are less important if la-
bour markets are more flexible. More flexibility can be achieved, for example, by lower 
employment protection, higher incentives of households to work and a less centralized 
wage bargaining process. 
Regarding financial market reforms, Gianetti et al (2002) have looked at the relationship 
between financial development and growth using an international industrial panel. The 
results support the hypothesis that financial development promotes growth, particularly 
in industries that are more dependent on external finance. Firm-level estimates turn out 
to be quite consistent with their industry-level results. Strahan (2002) has analyzed the 
effects of deregulations on bank entry and expansion on the economy using a two-step 
approach.Growth and volatility in real per capita income in US states is regressed on 
certain measures of banking regulation, and employment shares of different sectors. The 
evidence suggests that deregulation has accelerated economic growth but also provided 
a higher macroeconomic stability as it has reduced the sensitivity to shocks to local 
bank’s capital. 
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Annex 3: Topics of the experts seminar 
As an integral part of this study a workshop was organized in Bruxelles to gather differ-
ent views of experts regarding the advantages and disadvantages of the different ap-
proaches. Participants were selected on the base of their previous experience with policy 
modelling and their potential capability to construct a tool to model the impact of struc-
tural reforms. The workshop has been divided into three sessions. The first one was re-
lated to data requirements and the single equation approach, especially applied by the 
OECD. The second session was devoted to CGE, while the third one to DSGE models. 
Two paper presenters and one discussant were assigned to each session. 
In the first session, Olivia Galgau (ULB Bruxelles) discussed the requirements on insti-
tutional data from the perspective of model users. For the sake of concreteness, the 
presentation focused on the link between firm entry and exit rates and economic growth, 
see Galgau (2005). It was clearly pointed out that indicators for the institutional setting 
have to be reported more frequently. Stronger effort should be undertaken to construct 
reliable time series data, while missing values need to be filled out. This would improve 
the quality of the econometric analysis. Paul Conway (OECD) presented the OECD 
institutional database on product market regulation, in particular for non-manufacturing 
industries and construction principles for the respective series. Furthermore, new indica-
tors measuring the ‘knock-on’ effects of regulation in certain non-manufacturing sectors 
on all sectors of the economy were presented (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). Here, the 
relevance of sectors as suppliers of intermediate inputs is taken into account. Thus, re-
forms in individual sectors will affect the whole economy, as the sectors are embedded 
in the entire production structure. Hector Pollitt (Cambridge Econometrics) was the dis-
cussant of the session. 
In the second session, Arjan Lejour (CPB, The Hague) has examined the impact of 
structural reforms using the WorldScan CGE model. Lisbon type reforms were consid-
ered in the areas of employment targets, R&D expenditures, human capital accumula-
tion, the administrative burden and the implementation of the services directive. High 
positive effects of the reform measures were detected. According to the simulation re-
sults, the largest gains could be expected from an increase in employment and R&D 
expenditures. Ali Bayar (ULB Bruxelles) provided a discussion of different kinds of 
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models with special emphasis on the CGE approach. As a main asset, CGE models are 
based on optimization behaviour of households and firms, and are able to acknowledge 
for a wide range of heterogeneity across agents. However, they have deficits concerning 
the analysis of dynamic adjustment processes. Thus, an integrated framework is supe-
rior to analyse the impacts of structural reforms. Specifically, CGEs should be extended 
by macroeconometric models or DSGEs. Christian Dreger (DIW Berlin) served as the 
discussant of this session. 
The DSGE approach was the main topic in the third session. Guenter Coenen (ECB) 
examined the impact of tax reforms on the labour market in the euro area, see Coenen, 
McAdam and Straub (2006). The basic model structure was developed, and a calibrated 
two-country version of the ECB area wide model was applied. In particular, the analysis 
focused on labour market distortions caused by the tax wedge. A reduction in the distor-
tions to the US level is expected to raise employment and output by roughly 10 percent 
in the long run. Werner Roeger (EU Commission) presented the QUEST model of the 
EU Commission with exogeneous technology. Endogeneous technological change is not 
included in the standard version, but possible linkages to R&D were also discussed. 
Structural reforms, such as a reduced wage mark up, higher competition, and an in-
crease in productivity were considered, thereby allowing for endogeneous fiscal and 
monetary policy response. Simulation evidence pointed to positive effects on employ-
ment and production. For the productivity shock, the employment reaction was positive 
only after an adjustment period. Eric Mayer (University of Wuerzburg) served as the 
discussant of this session. 
This present report has largely benefited from the workshop contributions. As a main 
conclusion, no approach dominantes the alternatives in general. All of them have their 
strengths and weaknesses, and it is very important to keep them in mind when the im-
pact of structural reforms is interpreted. In principle, the analysis should be based on 
different types of models. This strategy can reveal robust insights into the working of 
structural reforms. Furthermore, the simulation capabilities of existing models can be 
enhanced by the combination of the different tools, where the outcome of one model 
can be used as input in the other. For example, single equation models can provide rele-
vant information for macroeconometric models or CGEs, without affecting the basic 
theoretical structure or the stability properties of the large scale models. The new OECD 
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indicators on the ‘knock-on’ effects of regulation in specific sectors can serve as a con-
venient tool to bridge the gap between reforms at the sectoral level and the overall 
economy. Due to the construction principles of the indicators, sectoral reforms can be 
projected into reforms at the macroeconomic level. This property is especially of inter-
est for models which typically do not rely on a sectoral disaggregation, in particular 
DSGE models, including QUEST. For CGEs, the new indicators appear to be less rele-
vant, as they are already specified for a huge number of sectors, and spillovers between 
them are included as an integral part of the model philosophy. 
 







Selected models to study the re-
form impact 
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In this part of the report, the most appropriate models to study the macroeconomic im-
pact of structural reforms are reviewed. The presentation is limited to the top 5 models. 
The selection does not imply that the models are the best ones, but they are well docu-
mented and good representatives for the underlying model philosophies, in particular 
for the CGE and DSGE approach. All models are based on simultaneous equation sys-
tems and are focused on the entire economy. Therefore, the tools allow to investigate a 
wide range of structural reforms and take possible spillovers between the variables into 
account. In chapter 9, the basic structure of the models is presented, and in chapter 10, 
comparative advantages are discussed. 
 
9 Top  5  models 
Because the frameworks presented in typology of models and on the experts seminar 
have their individual strengths and weaknesses, a one size fits all strategy might not be 
the appropriate choice to get insights into the likely impacts of structural reforms in 
product and labour markets. A variety of different tools is required instead and recom-
mended from the perspective of a robustness analysis. But, some pre-selection across 
the different typologies seems to be useful. In our view, the most appropriate models to 
study the impact of structural reforms include two CGE models (WorldScan, Green-
Mod), a macroeconometric model based on an extensive disaggregation of the mac-
roeconomy in sectors and regions (E3ME) and two DSGE models (GEM, QUEST). 
This selection is motivated by the theoretical soundness of the approach, previous simu-
lation experience, and documentation. In addition, the models are continuously used in 
the policy consulting process and are maintained by their developers. The selection does 
not imply that the models are the best ones. 
 
9.1  The WorldScan model (CPB) 
WorldScan is a recursively dynamic general equilibrium model for the world economy, 
developed for the analysis of long-term issues in the field of international economics, 
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see Lejour, Veenendaal, Verweij and van Leeuwen (2006). It is built on a sectoral struc-
ture and has been employed to analyse trends like permanent shifts in TFP, international 
aspects of an ageing society, the rise of emerging countries, the depletion of natural re-
sources, and the emissions of greenhouse gasses. The model is microfounded and de-
termines the joint equilibrium in a huge number of markets. 
Production functions relate output to factor inputs and intermediates, while inputs are 
used in different proportions across sectors. There is one representative firm per sector 
within each region. Main factor inputs are high and low skilled labour, and capital. In-
termediate inputs are goods, services and energy. The inputs are substitutable to some 
extent. Factor demand is derived from cost minimisation, given the production technol-
ogy. In particular, the latter is specified as a nested CES structure. The growth of total 
factor productivity is considered as exogenous. However, productivity can be affected 
in an endogenous way in model variants where spillovers of R&D are included. Labour 
supply is exogenous and derived from demographic trends and projected participation 
rates in the labour force. For low and high skilled labour, supply and demand are equal 
at the market clearing wage. 
The distinction of different qualities of labour is relevant not only for labour market 
issues, but also for the analysis of economic growth. It affects specialisation patterns 
across economies. As a rule, OECD regions endowed with a relatively high amount of 
high skilled labour tend to specialise in the production of high skilled labour-intensive 
goods, while regions endowed with an important share of low skilled labour will spe-
cialise in low-skilled labour-intensive goods. There is no mobility of labour across the 
country borders. 
In contrast to the labour market, capital markets are assumed to be linked to each other 
across countries. Thus, if capital is abundant in one region and hence relatively inexpen-
sive, it is invested in another region in which capital is scarce and relatively expensive. 
However, there are some barriers to investing in the foreign countries. Hence, interre-
gional capital mobility does reduce, but not completely eliminate, capital price differen-
tials between the regions. Due to the imperfect integration, countries might have differ-
ent real interest rates. This also allows the analysis of foreign investment flows and fur-
ther integration of these markets in the process of globalization. 
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Supply side GDP is equal to the sum of consumption, investment and exports minus 
imports. The consumption bundle of the different goods and services is determined such 
that it implies maximal utility to the representative household, given his budget con-
straint. Savings depend on the demographic composition of the population, thereby cap-
turing the effects of an ageing society and per capita income growth, and investments 
are driven by savings. 
Generally, the demand of households for a good refers to the home and foreign market. 
In each region a different variety of a good is being produced. Customers demand all the 
varieties. The demand depends on the relative price, the substitution possibilities be-
tween the varieties, transportation costs, trade barriers and preferences. If the price of a 
particular variety rises, demand will shift to other varieties. Correspondingly, a large 
share of trade between countries is on the intra-industry level, i.e. bilateral trade in simi-
lar, but not identical products. Differences in endowments do not play an important role. 
Thus trade flows are modelled by the Armington (1969) assumption: firms in each re-
gion produce a unique variety of a particular good. Regional varieties are imperfect sub-
stitutes, and firms exert some monopoly power over their own variety and can choose 
the price, given the level of demand. 
The government sector is not included in very much detail. Fiscal authorities collect 
taxes on imports and consumption, and spend the tax income on export subsidies and 
consumption. Monetary policy measures are excluded from the model, as the equilib-
rium is realized in every period. 
Data are used from the GTAP-6 base that comprises complete and consistent accounts 
for 87 regions and 57 sectors for 2001 as the base year, see Dimanaran and McDougall 
(2005) for a description of the data set. The data are used to derive the demand, produc-
tion and trade patterns, and also the labour and capital intensities of the different sectors. 
There is a core version of the model which serves as the starting point for each project. 
However, depending on simulation needs, the model can be implemented with alterna-
tive mechanisms, sectoral or regional classifications. A number of recent applications of 
the model can be found in Van de Klundert and Nahuis (1998), Lejour and Tang (2000), 
De Mooij and Tang (2003), Bollen, Manders and Mulder (2004), Bollen, Manders and 
Veenendaal (2005) and Lejour and De Mooij (2005). 
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Tang and Verweij (2004) have employed WorldScan for the analysis of the impact of 
product market reforms. They focus on the quantification of the direct and indirect ef-
fects of reducing the administrative burden on firms. A lower burden is expected to 
boost investment, thereby increase output and labour productivity. For an individual 
country a unilateral reduction probably has different effects than a reduction that is part 
of a coordinated, EU wide strategy. Due to data limitations, Tang and Verweij (2004) 
assume that the Netherland’s figures on administrative burdens also hold for other EU 
members. Then, the cost of the administrative burden in the entire EU would amount to 
340 billion euro per year, which is approximately 3.7 percent of overall GDP. Gelauff 
and Lejour (2006a) have employed the model with regard to five key goals of the Lis-
bon agenda, namely the implementation of the services directive, the reduction of ad-
ministrative burdens, goals of improving human capital, targets on R&D expenditures, 
and a higher employment rate. In order to improve the analysis of the internal market 
for services the model has been extended with imperfect competition and increasing 
returns to scale (De Bruijn, 2006). Work is underway to introduce foreign direct in-
vestments as a vehicle for the provision of services abroad. 
 
9.2  The GreenMod model (FUB) 
GreenMod is a recursively dynamic general equilibrium model specified for the Belgian 
economy (Bayar, 2006). It covers Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia as regions, thereby 
including interdependences between regions and linkages between the regions and the 
rest of the world. All regions are connected through bilateral trade, capital, and labour 
flows, where substitution possibilities are not perfect (Armington (1969) elasticities). 
The model describes the behaviour of firms, households, government and the rest of the 
world. Imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale, vintage capital, different types 
of energy technologies most relevant for environmental issues, sector-specific R&D 
investments, and different skills of labour are considered Furthermore, labour market 
characteristics important for structural reforms are recognized, like wage bargaining, 
search and matching processes, and human capital accumulation. 
The model is built upon a very detailed level of disaggregation. In the production and 
consumption blocs, 62 sectors and 69 commodities are distinguished. In addition, the 
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framework describes the behaviour of about 10 types of households, based upon their 
income, as defined by the deciles in the income distribution. Besides labour income, 
each household group gets a fixed share of the capital income originating from the re-
gion of residence and transfers from the local and federal governments, from firms and 
the external sector. A share of the net income is saved, whereas differences between net 
income and savings planned are allocated to the budget disposable for consumption de-
cisions. Government behaviour and tax systems are modelled at the federal, regional, 
and community level. 
The model incorporates the representation of oligopolistic and monopolistically com-
petitive sectors. Each firm has a nested Leontief or CES production structure with en-
ergy, labour and capital as inputs and acts as a profit-maximiser. It chooses its output 
level based upon its marginal costs and the price elasticities of demand. The behaviour 
of firms defines the overall performance of the industry in terms of number of operating 
enterprises, output and price levels. 
Differences in the industry structure between regions are explained by variation in the 
economies of scale. Strategic interactions of firms in imperfectly competitive industries 
are represented using spatial Cournot oligopoly or monopolistic competition frame-
works. A share of output in each sector is produced by malleable capital, whereas the 
rest by using old capital vintages (rigid capital). The possibilities of substitution among 
the input factors are higher for the malleable than for the rigid capital. The older the 
latter the lower are the substitution possibilities between capital and other factors of 
production, and thus the lower the adjustments in input demand in response to changes 
in relative prices. Due to the coexistence of malleable and different generations of rigid 
capital within the same period, substitution effects can be delayed over time and de-
mand for inputs adjusts gradually in reaction to relative prices changes, see Van der 
Mensbrugghe (1994). 
Production costs involve variable and fixed components. In particular, the formulation 
of capital and labour demand by each sector and region is modified by including labour 
and capital fixed costs depending upon the number of firms in the respective industry. 
Sectoral marginal costs are based on the total fixed costs relevant for that sector. In oli-
gopolistic markets, prices are calculated as a mark-up over marginal costs and depend 
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upon the total number of operating firms. Prices of monopolistically-competitive sectors 
are calculated as a mark-up over marginal cost. The number of firms in equilibrium is 
derived from the zero profit condition. 
Sectoral and regional wages are bargained between trade unions and firms. Trade un-
ions maximize their utility function that depends upon the total wage of their members 
which are employed and total unemployment benefits of the unemployed. Firms try to 
maximize their profits. Hence total profits of the firms are shared between the firms and 
workers, in a proportion depending upon the unions bargaining power. 
GreenMod has a recursive dynamic structure, i.e. the solution of the model is composed of a 
sequence of annual equilibria, in which current savings determine future capital accumula-
tion and the growth rate of the economy. In the long run the number of oligopolistic firms 
does not change and output of each firm increases with the same rate as the rest of the re-
gional economy. The simulation horizon of the model is set at 25 years but can be extended 
in a flexible way. GreenMod is combined with a microsimulation model to evaluate distribu-
tional effects on individual households. Regional social accounting matrices have been con-
structed for 2003. 
GreenMod has powerful capabilities for impact and scenario analysis allowing for medium 
and long term assessment of the consequences of structural reforms at the sectoral, regional 
and national level. Dynamic interactions between markets and agents are taken into account, 
as well as rigidities of wages and prices and industrial organisation. The disaggregation is 
flexible and can be adjusted according to the simulation needs. The model provides results 
for a large number of variables regarding the impacts of economy wide or sectoral shocks. 
Among others, the model has recently been used to investigate location decisions of firms 
and energy related issues. 
 
9.3  The E3ME model (Cambridge Econometrics) 
The E3ME is a macroeconometric model to analyse the long term implications of En-
ergy-Environment-Economy (E3) policies, especially those concerning R&D and envi-
ronmental taxation and regulation (Cambridge Econometrics, 2006). E3ME combines 
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the features of a short and medium term sectoral model, estimated by econometric 
methods, with the detail and some of the methods of CGE models that provide analysis 
of the movement of the long term outcomes for key E3 indicators in response to policy 
changes, including the supply side of the labour market. Most of the variables are speci-
fied at a 41-industry level. The system is solved simultaneously on an annual base for 
all industries and 27 regions across Europe. 
Economic activities undertaken by agents affect other groups with a time lag, and the 
spillovers persist into future generations, although many of the effects soon become 
negligible. But there are many actors, and the effects, both beneficial and damaging, 
accumulate in economic and physical stocks. The effects are transmitted through the 
environment (with externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions contributing to the 
global warming), through the economy and the price and monetary system, and through 
the global transport and information networks. The markets transmit effects through 
three main channels: through the level of activity creating demand for inputs of materi-
als, fuels and labour; through wages and prices affecting incomes; and through incomes 
leading to further demands for goods and services. 
The model considers economies and diseconomies of scale in production and consump-
tion. Furthermore; markets face different degrees of competition. Labour markets are 
characterised by long-term unemployment. The speed and extent of the labour augment-
ing technological progress is affected by market imperfections, including for example 
non-constant returns to scale in production. For the EU economy, exogenous factors are 
economic activity and prices in non-EU world areas and economic policies including 
tax rates, growth in government expenditures, interest rates and exchange rates). For the 
energy system of the model, the outside factors are the world oil prices and energy poli-
cies including regulation of energy industries. For the environment component, exoge-
nous factors cover policies such as reduction in SO2 emissions by means of end-of-pipe 
filters from large combustion plants. 
 
9.4  The GEM model (IMF) 
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The Global Economic Model (GEM) of the IMF is an open economy DSGE model with 
strong theoretical underpinnings of the main behavioural equations (Bayoumi, 2004, 
and Bayoumi, Laxton and Pensenti, 2004). The focus of GEM is on international trade 
and interdependencies between the economic developments of countries. Markups are a 
key feature of the model. Because goods are differentiated (tradables and non tradables, 
intermediate and final goods), firms act in an environment of monopolistic competition 
and can restrict output to create extra profits. The elasticity of substitution of demand 
between products of different firms determines the market power of each firm. If all 
products are perfect substitutes, the elasticity of substitution tends to infinity, and the 
mark up would converge to 0. Workers also have market power and limit their labour to 
raise the real wage. Each worker offers a specific kind of labour services that is an im-
perfect substitute for services offered by other workers. The lower the degree of substi-
tutability, because of skill differences or anti-competitive regulation, the higher is the 
markup, and the lower the employment level. 
Dynamic processes can be traced to adjustment costs relevant to real and nominal vari-
ables. For example, sticky wages and prices, sluggish adjustment of trade volumes and 
habit persistence in consumption expenditures are included in the GEM. Expectations of 
agents are model consistent, i.e. in each period expectations coincide with the model’s 
solution for the future. 
According to the model developers, the most innovative feature of GEM is its flexible 
structure, see Bayoumi (2004). This means that one can include or exclude features such 
as non traded goods, or trade in commodities and other intermediate goods. The model 
can also be created with any number of countries. The simplest form is just a two coun-
try framework, in which labour and capital are combined to produce a single tradable 
good that can be spend for consumption or investment. Given the preferences of domes-
tic and foreign agents, the good is distributed across the two economies. Because of the 
flexible structure, modules that are not of central importance for the simulation needs 
can be relaxed. In this sense, transmission mechanisms become simpler and more trans-
parent in the smaller versions of the model. 
Deep long run parameters such as the elasticity of labour in respect to the real wage or 
the elasticities of substitution between different goods or input factors are determined 
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on grounds of microeconomic studies. Short run coefficients are chosen to generate re-
alistic dynamic responses. As an example, adjustment cost parameters are calibrated to 
replicate existing evidence from data driven approaches, like vector autoregressions or 
the Area Wide Model of the ECB (Fagan, Henry and Mestre, 2005). 
Several versions of the GEM have already been used to simulate a number of issues, 
including the effectiveness of alternative monetary policy rules, the effects of higher oil 
prices on the world economy and in particular the benefits of greater competition in the 
euro area, see Bayoumi (2004). In particular, the long term impact of a change in labour 
market competition in the euro area on the economic performance at home and abroad 
has been examined by lowering the wage mark up parameter. The quantitative effects 
on the domestic economy are crucially influenced by the response of labour input to a 
change in the real wage, while international effects depend on the degree on which 
home and foreign goods are substitutes. As a principal finding, higher competition 
proxied by a decrease in the mark ups on wages will raise domestic output and con-
sumption. In addition, nominal inertia is reduced through an increase in competition. In 
fact, higher competition increases the costs firms incur when wages deviate from their 
flexible price level. Hence, monetary policy would become more effective, and the 
trade-off between inflation and the output gap is improved. The benefits likely induce 
positive spillovers to the foreign country, mainly through a positive effect in the terms 
of trade. 
More recently, Everaert and Schule (2006) studied the effects of reforms in product and 
labour markets in the EU. They classify the member states into four groups: the individ-
ual euro area country under consideration, the rest of the euro area, the group of the 
three non-euro area EU15 members (Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom), and, 
the ten new member states. They consider two different setups, one for a large euro area 
country, approximated by France, and one for a small euro area country, approximated 
by Belgium. Reforms are implemented through a gradual reduction in mark ups in la-
bour and goods markets until achieving the level of the non euro area countries in five 
years, while in the services sector, deregulation is assumed to progress slower, taking 
ten years. The non euro area countries are chosen as a benchmark since reforms in these 
countries are more advanced. 
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In order to analyse if synchronization across countries matters, reforms are implemented 
in a standalone fashion by France or Belgium, respectively, but also synchronized with 
the rest of the euro area. The results show that coordination of the timing of structural 
reforms leads to faster adjustment and eliminates transactions costs. When mark ups are 
reduced in the whole euro area, nominal interest rates fall enough to prevent transitory 
deflation due to a more intense monetary policy reaction. However, the results are sub-
jected to caveats. First, since no interactions between markups in various markets are 
considered the effects are largely additive while interactions between labour and prod-
uct market reforms can be important. Second, in reality, the reforms might not be credi-
ble initially, and if there is uncertainty about how the economy will react, the monetary 
policy reaction cannot be mechanical. 
 
9.5  The QUEST II model (EU Commission) 
QUEST is a DSGE model designed to analyse the economies in the EU member states 
and their interactions with the rest of the world, especially the US and Japan, see Roeger 
and In’t Veld (1997, 2002). It contains structural models for the individual EU member 
states, the US and Japan and distinguishes 10 additional countries and regions in a trade 
feedback module to examine interactions with the rest of the world. The focus is on how 
the effects of policy actions are transmitted to the domestic and international economy 
in the medium term. The model combines general equilibrium principles with features 
of Keynesian style rigidities. 
Expectations of agents are model consistent, i.e. in each period expectations coincide 
with the model solution. The behavioural equations are based on principles of dynamic 
optimization. Private households and firms maximise utilities and profits subject to in-
tertemporal budget constraints, implying that consumption and investment decisions 
incorporate forward looking behaviour. Firms operate in a monopolistically competitive 
environment. Potential output is produced via a nested CES and Cobb Douglas produc-
tion function with capital, energy, and private sector employment as inputs. According 
to the neoclassical growth model, the steady state path is determined by the growth rates 
of labour augmenting technological progress (TFP) and population. TFP increases at an 
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exogenous rate and a capital efficiency index, where the latter depends on the mean age 
of the capital stock. 
Factor demand equations are modelled consistent to the production technology thereby 
taking rigidities into account. For investment, adjustment costs to the capital stock are 
considered, as installation of new capital can be costly, and workers may have to be 
retrained etc. Investment is explained by the ratio between the market value of the firm 
and the replacement value of its capital (Tobin’s q). In addition, labour input cannot be 
adjusted instantaneously. Therefore, a distinction is important between short and long 
run elasticities with respect to output and the real wage. The latter includes a premium 
which is based on the search and separation costs of firms. Energy demand is explained 
by the output level and the relative price of energy, including energy taxes. 
Total consumption is represented as the aggregation of the behaviour of two groups of 
consumers. A forward looking group follows the optimal consumption rule according to 
the life cycle permanent income hypothesis, while a second group behave as rule-of-
thumb consumers. Their consumption depends on current disposable income because of 
liquidity constraints (Campbell and Mankiw, 1991). Hence full Ricardian equivalence is 
not expected to hold. For the government, a debt rule is imposed in order to make the 
development of the budget more sustainable. 
It is assumed that each country or region produces a product which is an imperfect sub-
stitute for the products of other regions. Imports of a country are a function of total de-
mand in the home country and relative prices, defined as the ratio between the domestic 
consumption and import price deflator. Exports depend on world trade and relative 
prices, the latter measured as the ratio between competitors and export prices, expressed 
in terms of the foreign currency. A number of stock flow interactions are embedded in 
the model. Stocks like physical capital, net foreign assets, money and government debt 
are endogenously determined. Wealth effects have an impact on the flows of savings, 
and production and investment decisions of private households, firms and the govern-
ment. 
In the short run, actual and potential output can deviate. Dynamic responses are justified 
by rigidities of wages and prices, liquidity constrained consumers and the presence of 
adjustment costs. Specifically, firms set their prices sluggishly. In particular, they re-
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spond to changes in capacity utilisation and current unit labour costs. Due to monopolis-
tic behaviour, firms are able to charge a mark up over marginal costs, implying that out-
put is lower than in the perfect competition environment. Forward and backward look-
ing elements are important in price setting behaviour (Galí, Gertler and Lopez-Salido, 
2001). As firms set prices on a staggered basis, and wage contracts are negotiated for a 
number of periods, nominal inertia will occur. Only a fraction of prices and wages will 
adjust at each point in time. 
Furthermore, a bargaining framework is used to describe the interactions between work-
ers and firms in the labour market, see Pissarides (1990). Both workers and firms seem 
to have an interest in longer term employment contracts due to, for example, training or 
mobility costs or as insurance against unemployment. The degree by which the marginal 
product of labour and labour market tightness influence the level of current wage con-
tracts is determined by the bargaining strength of workers. In the case of perfect compe-
tition, real wages are equal to the marginal product of labour, while in the case of imper-
fect competition and bargaining power, there exists some rent sharing between workers 
and firms. Real wages also depend negatively on the unemployment rate, since a high 
unemployment rate has an adverse effect on the probability of finding a job. The reser-
vation wage is composed of unemployment benefits and the value of leisure and defines 
a lower floor for bargained wages. If workers have bargaining power, the actual wage 
will exceed the reservation level, and this mechanism explains the existence of long 
term unemployment. 
Asset markets are fully integrated across all industrialised regions. There is perfect capi-
tal mobility, but home and foreign bonds are not perfectly substitutable. Hence the un-
covered interest parity relation includes a risk premium, which is considered as exoge-
nous. As the Fisher relationship holds, the real interest rate is stationary. The monetary 
authorities set short term nominal interest rates to either target the money stock, an in-
flation target, or in accordance to some formulation of a Taylor rule. 
While QUEST has been primarily designed to analyse changing macroeconomic trends 
due to European economic integration, it has been used quite flexible for policy analy-
sis, for example to assess the impact of the Maastricht criteria on output growth and 
employment, the long run effects of fiscal consolidation, the impact of monetary policy 
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on the success of a cut in government expenditures, and the macroeconomic effects of 
tax reforms and VAT harmonisation (see Roeger, in’t Veld, 1997). In addition, simula-
tion evidence so far includes shocks to the productivity level and the reservation wage 
(Roeger , in’t Veld, 2002). 
Roeger and in’t Veld (2002) have considered the effects from a fall in the long term 
unemployment rate. In QUEST, the reduction is achieved by a decrease in the reserva-
tion wage. This puts pressure on wage demands of unions, reduces real wage costs and 
boots employment. Depending on the dynamics embedded in the model, the increase in 
employment occurs gradually, with higher gains in the second and third year after the 
shock. The increase in employment is fully anticipated by the agents. The policy raises 
demand on impact, and this increase exceeds the expansion in potential output. How-
ever, the latter only gradually improves as employment is boosted. In response to the 
positive output gap, monetary policy will temporarily raise the interest rate, and infla-
tion is slightly above the baseline during the first year. Differences between countries 
are linked to differences in the size of the government sector, as government employ-
ment in exogenous in the model. 
 
10  Comparative model advantages 
The top 5 models are all suitable to investigate the impacts of structural reforms on the 
macroeconomic performance. However, individual strengths and weaknesses have to be 
taken into account for a proper interpretation of the results. It should be noted, that the 
pros and cons are less related to individual models. Instead they refer to the respective 
model type considered. For example, CGE models are especially suited for comparative 
static analysis. This is also the case with WorldScan and GreenMod. In addition, the 
models should not be interpreted as fixed and unchangeable structures, as satellite mod-
els can extend their simulation capabilities. A summary of the top 5 models is given in 
table 4. The detailed comparison is limited to the WorldScan and the QUEST model, as 
these tools are already in use at the EU Commission. 
WorldScan assumes an equilibrium in each period of time. Hence the model should not 
be employed to study adjustment processes. The recursive dynamic structure of World-
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Scan and other CGEs is built on a sequence of simultaneous equilibria in the product, 
labour and financial markets. Hence, only the long term effects of structural reforms can 
be uncovered. But, as a major asset, these impacts can be differentiated for a large num-
ber of economic sectors, including different skills of labour which is of special impor-
tance in the analysis of the low income sector. Because of limitations in the solving al-
gorithms, only a few sectors are considered in QUEST, but adjustment towards equilib-
rium can be studied in much more detail. As the short run behaviour is affected by a 
number of imperfections, the potential adverse demand effects of structural reforms can 
be explored in a straightforward manner. As the models have individual pros and cons, 
they should not be as complements to reveal robust insights into the likely impact of 
structural reforms. 
Table 4: Comparison of top 5 models 
WorldScan, 
GreenMod 
CGEs, heterogeneity of agents. Useful for comparative static analysis, 
but less useful for dynamic adjustment processes. Ex ante and ex post 
analysis of the long run impacts of structural reforms, as equations are 
founded on microeconomic optimization behaviour. GreenMod covers 
the Belgian economy and their interactions with the rest of the world, 
need to be adjusted for other regions 
E3ME  Macroeconometric model with sectoral and regional disaggregation. 
Data driven approach, as equations are estimated by econometric tech-
niques. Suitable in particular for short run impacts. Spillovers between 
generations are taken into account, special relevance for environment 
and energy issues 
GEM, 
QUEST 
DSGEs, homogeneity of agents or only a few heterogeneous groups. 
Useful to analyse the short and long run impacts of structural reforms, 
as dynamic adjustment is an integral part. Ex ante and ex post analysis 
of structural reforms, as equations are founded on microeconomic op-
timization behaviour 
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QUEST has comparative advantages concerning the specification of government behav-
iour. The model offers a relative detailed description of public finances. Different vari-
ables for taxes, social security contributions and transfers are distinguished, including 
taxes on wages, a corporate and a lump-sum tax, and VAT. Hence it is possible to in-
vestigate the direct effects of structural reforms on these measures, including the budg-
etary consequences. These impacts can be separated for the short and long run. More-
over, monetary policy is specified using alternative reaction functions. In contrast, the 
government sector is included in the WorldScan model only in a rudimentary way, and 
monetary policy is missing at all. 
QUEST takes several product and labour market imperfections into account. Participa-
tion rates and the reservation wage which are important for labour supply can be di-
rectly affected. For example, the reduction of unemployment benefits in order to stimu-
late labour supply can be immediately captured by model variables. Mark ups to wages 
and prices provide the main transmission channels to study the indirect effects of re-
forms. These measures are seen as indicators for the degree of product and labour mar-
ket distortions. The size of mark-ups is inversely related to the macroeconomic per-
formance. Generally, a stronger deregulation leads to a rise in the degree of competition, 
and a corresponding fall in the mark up. 
Employment protection legislation and active labour market policies can have an impact 
on the mark up to negotiated wages, as these measures affect the bargaining power of 
insiders. In addition policies might boost technological progress, which is embedded in 
the TFP rate. In principle, policy measures aiming to improve the accumulation of 
knowledge can be also investigated in QUEST, as they can influence the efficiency of 
capital goods and partially TFP. Nevertheless, the model should be extended to cover a 
more elaborated view regarding the impact of R&D investments and technology to dis-
cuss issues related to the knowledge based economy. Fixed costs of production may be 
also added to the QUEST model to have a lever to model entry barriers and impedi-
ments for starting a business. 
Similar issues can be explored by WorldScan, keeping in mind that adjustment proc-
esses are neglected. As a main asset, the inclusion of the sectoral perspective allows the 
analysis of reforms targeted to specific sectors, such as network liberalization or deregu-
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lation in certain industries. Regarding labour market reforms, participation and unem-
ployment rates can be directly affected to investigate the impact of reforms on labour 
supply. Because two types of skill levels are distinguished, the effects of globalisation 
on the distribution of wages can be examined (Lejour and Tang, 2000). Also, employ-
ment shifts between sectors and migration flows could be analysed, although the latter 
is not incorporated in the model. However, as population, labour supply and skill pro-
jections are exogenous in WorldScan, it is possible to incorporate migration flows in 
these projections. The flows can change population and labour supply in various re-
gions. Other labour market policies or the effects of measures in the social security poli-
cies cannot be investigated in the current model version. 
There is also some weakness concerning the role of the public sector. WorldScan needs 
to be definitely extended to fill the gaps. On the other hand, the relationship between 
R&D expenditures and technological progress is modelled in a rather elaborated way. 
TFP growth is related to R&D expenditures in some model variants, and this link can be 
exploited to study the effects of R&D investment on a sectoral level. The analysis can 
account for several qualities of R&D: WorldScan covers R&D stocks of the own sector, 
of other sectors in the economy to reflect domestic spillovers, and of foreign sectors to 
reflect international spillovers. 
 







Core and satellite models 
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The part of the report will provide some insights about feasible strategies to examine 
structural reforms by combining core and satellite models. For the ease of exposition 
and the tools already available at the Commission, the discussion is focused on the 
QUEST model. It should be noted, however, that similar strategies also work with other 
kind of models. 
In principal, structural reforms can be implemented in two alternative ways. First, the 
effects of policy variables exogenous to the model can be analysed in a direct manner 
by simulating the change in the instrument. Second, reforms might have an indirect im-
pact of macroeconomic variables of interest which is transmitted through intermediate 
variables. Intermediates have to be specified in advance. Transmission channels can be 
considered by means of satellite models, using, among others, the single equation ap-
proach, but also multiequation techniques. Satellite models can be solved in a first step. 
Then, in a second step, their outcome is used as an input in one of the core alternatives. 
The core models provide the links between the transmission variables and macroeco-
nomic variables of interest, like production, employment and productivity. Structural 
reforms have a direct impact only on the intermediate variable, which is endogenous in 
a satellite model, but an indirect effect on the macroeconomic variables. For example, 
the use of regulation indicators requires a strategy along these lines. Indirect effects 
might be important for the bulk of reforms, because the core models contain only a few 
variables which are directly affected. 
In any case, the impact of structural reforms is studied using counterfactual techniques. 
Specifically, the core model is solved in a basic version, where no additional reforms 
are implemented. However, they are considered in the alternative solution, where the 
structural reform is assumed to be permanent. By comparing the outcome of the two 
simulation runs, the likely impact of the reforms is uncovered. 
The concrete modelling of structural reforms depends on how the respective measures 
are considered in QUEST. For a few reforms, like tax or social security reforms, the 
effects can be implemented directly as these policy variables are explicitly included in 
the model. However, this is not the case for the majority of reforms. Hence, it is neces-
sary to use a satellite model in order to quantify the effect of a certain policy change on 
an intermediate exogenous variable of QUEST in a first step. Then, in a second step, the 
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change in this variable is evaluated within the model in order to obtain the simulation 
results of the reforms considered. Satellite models are needed to study the transmission 
channels of reforms that are not introduced directly in the core model. Satellites can 
enhance the use of the QUEST model. They can be constructed rather easily, without 
changing the more complex structure of the core model. Hence, the flexibility of the 
model to investigate new policy issues is greatly improved. 
The objective of this part is to indicate what types of reforms could be modelled using 
satellite models and to provide a brief layout for the approaches to be linked to QUEST. 
A more elaborated analysis would require a higher level of detail of the reforms to be 
evaluated and an in-depth analysis of statistical information on macro variables and in-
stitutional indicators, which is beyond the scope of this project. Chapter 11 gives a ty-
pology of reforms that could be evaluated by satellite models and provides a discussion 
on the flexibility of a core versus satellite models. Chapter 12 looks at concrete exam-
ples and provides a blueprint for the satellite models for structural reforms on the prod-
uct and labour markets and to analyse policies promoting a knowledge-based economy. 
In addition, the joint use of multiple satellite models and interactions between the satel-
lites and the core model are addressed. 
 
11  Working with satellite models 
To construct satellites, two steps are important. First, transmission variables of reforms 
need to be identified in order to introduce their effects in the QUEST model. Second, an 
appropriate modelling strategy has to be applied. As already emphasized, cross sections 
do not allow to disentangle the impact of structural reforms from other country specific 
characteristics. Time series data allow for delays in the effects. But, the time series ap-
proach is difficult to handle, as there may be insufficient variation in the regressors. 
Thus, the best option is a dynamic panel structure, where the impact of the reforms will 
be separated from other country characteristics embedded in the fixed effects. By this 
approach, average effects across countries are uncovered. 
The reforms to be investigated have to be proxied by appropriate institutional regres-
sors. To study the strength of effects to be expected, the latter should be available on a 
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quantitative scale. However, both types of variables, tansmission variables and institu-
tional regressors should be available as a time series for each country. For example, the 
TFP rate should be revealed not as a constant rate of technological progress, but pref-
erably as a Solow residual, which allows variations within a country over time. Like-
wise, mark ups should reflect business cycle fluctuations to some extent, see Banerjee, 
Cockerell and Russell (2001). 
Rank scaled indicators for the institutional impact should be replaced by quantitative 
series, if available. The suitability of the latter can be checked by rank correlation analy-
sis. Appropriate strategies are considered in the next chapter, when concrete satellite 
models will be presented. It should be noted, however, that the actual magnitude of 
shocks inserted in the core models could be somehow unclear and require some judge-
mental element in the simulation process. For example, the introduction of stronger 
competition in product markets leads to a decline in the mark up, but the quantitative 
change is not determined in general. The link between particular policy measures and 
transmission variable may be established on the basis of econometric estimation or a 
literature review. 
An additional aspect is that structural reforms could affect the overall economy, but also 
specific sectors. This is not a problem from the perspective of satellite models, because 
they can be specified for both the sectoral and macroeconomic level. However, the 
QUEST model does not support a sectoral decomposition and therefore, satellites for 
particular sectors cannot be linked to QUEST without further knowledge. In these cases, 
additional tools are required to bridge the gap. Based on input-output analysis, the im-
portance of individual sectors for the overall economy can be estimated on the grounds 
of the flows of intermediate inputs between the different sectors. Input-output matrices 
are available at least for some large countries, which can be considered as representative 
for the entire economic area. The new OECD indicators on the ‘knock on’ effects of 
regulation are of interest in this regard. 
In principle, satellite models can be based on certain types of reforms or on transmission 
channels affected through the reforms. This choice is important if different reforms 
transmit through the same channel. For instance, TFP could be the transmission channel 
both for product market and R&D related reforms. Nevertheless, the transmission chan-
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nel is specific for particular reforms in most cases so that building the satellite based on 
the transmission channel or the type of reform does not make any difference. For exam-
ple, mark-ups in prices or entry and exit rates of firms are specific transmission chan-
nels of product market reforms, while the reservation wage or labour income taxes are 
subject to labour market reforms. 
An implementation of satellite models according to the type of reform is closer to the 
purposes of policy makers, as they are interested on the impact of specific reforms, 
without having a priori knowledge on the transmission channels. Also, it may be easier 
to relate reforms with specific Lisbon targets. On the other hand, satellite models based 
on transmission channels would allow the possibility of considering the impact of the 
structural reforms in more than one area simultaneously. Interactions among reforms 
can be better included without double counting the effects. For each transmission chan-
nel, an individual satellite model should be specified, whereas each type of reform could 
be associated to more than one model. 
 
11.1  Modified core models vs satellite models 
As an alternative to the construction of satellites, the structure of the core model can 
also be modified in order to cover structural reforms. The main advantage of this ap-
proach is that the transmission channel is explained endogeneously in the main model 
and the effect of the structural reforms is considered directly. 
The option of expanding the core model with more detailed formal submodels might be 
more attractive, as it imposes theoretical consistency. But, since CGEs and DSGEs are 
heavily built on microeconomic theory, the new equation has to be determined in line 
with microeconomic principles, which is not always feasible. Even in the case that there 
is a theoretical base for the specification, the main disadvantages of this approach is that 
it is time consuming, can only be applied for a limited number of policy fields, adds 
further complexity to the core model and makes it quickly unmanageable, see Gelauff 
and Lejour (2006b). There might be serious problems in the model solution due to nu-
merical limitations in the solving algorithms. 
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Another possibility is to have different versions of the core model, each one with differ-
ent details and subsequent complexity. Then, a model variant can be activated depend-
ing on the issues to be analysed, as the WorldScan model does. For instance, when ana-
lysing the impact of the structural reforms on the labour market it does not seem neces-
sary to include the R&D sector. However, it would be interesting to activate a version in 
which skill and non-skill workers would be distinguished, as they could response differ-
ently to the reforms. 
In the case of R&D, the core model can also be changed to consider the effects of poli-
cies in a direct way. Because R&D is highly relevant to the knowledge based economy, 
the implementation in the core model can even be superior. Specifically, a production 
function could be embedded in QUEST where a variable proxying the human capital 
stock is used as an additional input. Human capital is related to R&D activities. Indi-
viduals might spend time to accumulate skills. Thus, an additional relation transforming 
unskilled labour into skilled labour is required, see Jones (2002). Hence, the QUEST 
model with exogenous technology can be extended to include a link to human capital 
following the ideas discussed in Romer (1990) and Jones (1995). Also, the R&D sector 
could be specified in an endogenous way so that some behavioural equations need to be 
added. For example, R&D investment could depend on the marginal product of the ex-
isting stock of knowledge, the efficiency of R&D production and start up costs, like 
prices of new designs and other administrative costs. 
The option of modifying the core model should be used if sufficient theoretical insight 
is available, if a range of future applications is foreseen, or if the topic at hand has cru-
cial interactions with other model parts. Otherwise, the preferred procedure to follow 
consist of the combination of the QUEST model as a core and more specific satellite 
models to link specific policies to the model. 
 
11.2  Core and satellite interactions 
Individual satellite models are especially appropriate to examine the impact of reforms 
in isolation, more or less. However, empirical evidence points to the relative advantages 
of comprehensive over isolated reforms. In addition, the timing of certain reform steps 
as ingredients of an overall reform strategy may be important. For example, labour mar-
  81 
ket reforms seem to be easier to implement in countries where product markets are al-
ready deregulated, see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). Spillovers between different 
transmission channels might exist, for example between the wage and the price mark 
up. Recent joint estimates of these parameters indicate much higher mark ups on prod-
uct markets than traditional estimates, as the latter omit the part of the rent of the firms 
which is captured by workers, see Jean and Nicoletti (2002) and Dobbelaere (2005). 
Thus, structural reforms are interrelated, implying that individual satellites should be 
aggregated into a simultaneous equation system, where interdependencies and the tim-
ing of the various transmission channels are included. However, the complexity of the 
system is highly increased. 
It is also possible that different structural reforms affect the same transmission channel. 
Then, the specification of the satellite could not only consider the various structural re-
forms at the same time but also some interaction term to reflect the increasing returns 
arising from the fact of implementing a reform strategy. The main disadvantage of this 
proceeding could be the lack of degrees of freedom. Possible feedbacks between core 
and satellite models can be solved using iterative procedures to obtain the final model 
solution. The result of the satellite model will be included in the core model, and after 
solving the core model, the results are substituted back in the satellite etc. 
 
  82 
12  Concrete satellite models 
As already mentioned in the previous chapters, the reforms analyzed in this report are 
directed to reinforce the functioning of product and labour markets. In addition, strate-
gies to improve the accumulation of knowledge are included, since human capital is an 
important driver to economic growth. In this section, particular measures that could be 
modelled directly or indirectly using the satellite model framework are identified. The 
presentation is based on the division applied in the LABREF and MICREF databases of 
the EU Commission. 
 
12.1  Satellites for product market reforms 
Product market reforms are focused on internal and external market integration, compe-
tition policy, sector specific regulation, and the business environment. Most reforms 
aim to improve the level of competition. In terms of the QUEST model, they operate 
through the mark up of prices over marginal costs, which is exogenous. Furthermore, 
the incentives to innovate are stimulated in a more competitive environment, leading to 
an exogenous rise in the TFP rate. Also, an increase in competition can contribute to a 
fall in the entry barriers of markets. This is of special relevance for small and medium 
sized enterprises as well as for business start-ups. Therefore the main transmission vari-
ables for product market reforms are mark ups, the TFP rate and the entry and exit rates 
of firms. 
Satellite models for product market reforms should focus on the link of reform measures 
on the mark up of prices over marginal costs, the TFP rate and entry and exit rates. The 
transmission variables are already defined on a quantitative scale using the strategies 
outlined above, while potential institutional regressors like the PMR or MICREF indica-
tors for non-manufacturing industries are not. Possible quantitative surrogates could be 
the level of state aid, possibly differentiated for specific sectors or the size of govern-
ment enterprises and the role of the public sector in the overall economy. The idea is 
that an increase in the involvement of the state would limit individual choice, competi-
tion and innovation. The restructuring process of firms in response to shocks might be 
improperly prolonged, and business start ups are hampered. Then, the transmission vari-
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ables like TFP and the mark up could be explained by these proxies, utilizing the dy-
namic panel approach. Furthermore, important elements of the administrative burden 
might be expressed in terms of cost categories, for example as the number of days nec-
essary to start a new business, or in terms of the working time needed to fulfil bureau-
cratic requirements. See Tang and Verweij (2004) for the estimation of the costs of the 
administrative burden in the context of the WorldScan model. As an alternative, a lower 
administrative burden can be also directly implemented in QUEST, as the decrease can 
lead to a fall in labour costs or in the fixed costs of production. 
It is worth mentioning that some reforms can be directly introduced in the core model. 
If the economy could reach a higher growth path due to the reforms, the euro will nor-
mally appreciate against the US Dollar, at least according to monetary models for the 
exchange rate. QUEST could then be used to study the effects of a stronger currency. 
Moreover, the consequences of higher energy prices can be evaluated in a direct man-
ner. Two possible channels need to be distinguished here. A change in energy prices can 
affect the overall price level, with subsequent changes on the demand of private house-
holds. If the change in energy prices is long lasting, however, the effect on relative fac-
tor costs would become more important, thereby influencing the appropriate factor mix 
and the production side of the economy. 
 
12.2  Satellites for labour market reforms 
Labour market reforms should improve the employment perspectives, encourage work-
ers to participate and remain in the labour force. Taxes and transfers are crucial as they 
define the gap between labour costs and the take home pay. If net wages exceed unem-
ployment benefits only by a neglectable amount, the incentives to supply work might be 
reduced. Because unemployment is high in the EU, reforms could also try to reduce the 
average mark up in wages. This can be probably achieved by a more competitive envi-
ronment in the product market (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003) or by a less stringent 
system of employment protection legislation. The high level of long term unemploy-
ment and limited employment perspectives especially for the low qualified require some 
active labour market policies and training measures to activate these resources. Hence, 
important transmission variables for labour market reforms are the tax and transfer sys-
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tem, including the reservation wage and the mark up in wages. Furthermore, active la-
bour market policy measures could improve the skill level of workers. 
Overall, labour market reforms focus on four main areas: employment protection legis-
lation, the structure of the bargaining process, the tax and transfer system including un-
employment benefits and government expenditures for active labour market policies. In 
the QUEST model, the most relevant transmission channels include labour income 
taxes, the reservation wage and the wage mark up. They should be constructed as a time 
series. The labour market performance shows up in the participation and the unem-
ployment rate embedded in the core model. 
Variables describing the tax and transfer system are already available on a quantitative 
scale and can be used without further transformation. For example, higher incentives of 
households to work can be implemented through a decline in the reservation wage, 
where the latter can be directly influenced by a fall in unemployment benefits or the 
duration of these transfers. Alternatively, income taxes which are crucial for the wedge 
between labour costs and take home pay can be accessed. Unemployment benefits and 
active labour market policies should also affect the wage mark up. Lower benefits are 
expected to lead to a fall in the bargaining power of insiders. Higher expenditures for 
active labour market policy measures can improve the qualification and employability 
of workers. Thus, premia arising from search and vacancy costs might be reduced. In 
fact, vacancy cost is one of the parameters in the QUEST model that could be affected 
by structural reforms. However, in its current version, it is assumed that its value is 5 
percent of the wage cost for EU all members. Taking this into account, the use of a sat-
ellite model to test directly the impact of structural reforms on vacancy cost is not feasi-
ble. Moreover, many institutional indicators are only available on a rank scale, like cen-
tralization and coordination of the wage bargaining process and employment protection 
legislation for permanent and temporary working contracts. For these two reasons, suit-
able proxies have to be used instead. 
The long term unemployment rate might serve as a proxy for persistence and regulation. 
Stronger employment protection can reduce the response of labour markets to shocks. 
The chances of the unemployed to get back into work are reduced once a job is lost, and 
long term unemployment could increase. In the EU15, the rank correlation between the 
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long term unemployment rate and the OECD employment protection legislation index is 
0.4 for permanent and 0.5 for temporary working contracts (2003). Thus, a positive cor-
relation is supported by the data, but it is not very high. Other proxies are the average 
length of the notice period, severance pay or the maximum cumulated duration allowed 
for temporary working contracts. Moreover, the first principal component of the quanti-
tative proxies could provide a convenient measure. Anyway, if employment protection 
legislation affects the economy mainly through the wage mark up, the latter should be 
explained by proxies utilizing the dynamic panel approach. 
 
12.3  Satellites for the knowledge based economy 
The possibility to model reforms related to the knowledge based economy indirectly 
implies the specification of an empirical link between such policy measures and an in-
termediate variable which represent a transmission channel of these measures. The ef-
fects of investments in R&D or analogous reforms to stimulate innovation would take 
place through an increase in efficiency which translates into a TFP shock. The satellite 
model would therefore consist of two equations so that the estimation is performed us-
ing a two step instrumental variable approach in order to solve endogeneity issues. First, 
R&D is regressed on a vector of determinants of innovation, such as the degree of prod-
uct market competition, a high level of financial development and access to foreign in-
ventions (Jaumotte and Pain, 2005), as well as some indicators of regulation reforms on 
the R&D sector. Among others one may think of the availability of scientists and engi-
neers, the level of tertiary education, research conducted in the public sector (including 
universities) and business-academic links (public-private partnership). Second, the ef-
fect of the predicted levels of R&D is estimated on the TFP index. Then, the macro 
model is used to evaluate the effect of the respective changes in the TFP variable on the 
core model variables. An additional final remark relates to the feedback between the 
core and the satellite model. Changes in R&D would affect TFP, which would also af-
fect productivity and growth, which in turn would have an impact on R&D. An iterative 
solution would be the way to consider this feedback. 
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WorldScan is linked to specific satellites in order to translate specific Lisbon policies to 
the economic model. To compute the impact of reaching the targets on education and 
training, Jacobs (2005) developed a small, independent satellite model to WorldScan, 
which incorporates various issues of skill-formation needed to simulate the targets. This 
extension considers three disaggregated skill groups at the lower education level and for 
two types of higher educated workers. The disaggregated skills equations are calibrated, 
based on substitution elasticities and returns to education found in the literature. An-
other issue of implementation is the time lag between formal educations and the skill 
structure of the labour force. The Jacobs’ satellite model contains a stylised cohort 
model to compute the impact of reaching the targets in 2010 on the skill structure of the 
labour force in the period 2010-2040. Combining disaggregated skill categories, on-the-
job training and quality of education with a stylised cohort model, the satellite model 
computes a time path of the increase of labour efficiency that originates from Europe 
reaching the skill targets in 2010. This increase in labour efficiency is inserted in the 
WorldScan model. One issue to bear in mind is that although the simulation captures the 
most important costs of achieving the skills targets, it ignores the direct and institutional 
costs associated with larger levels of investments in formal schooling and training. 
 
 






Directions to model developing 
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13 Conclusions 
The aim of this project is to assess the feasibility of developing an instrument to model 
and estimate the impact of structural reforms on macroeconomic performance in the 
European Union Member States. Box 1 identifies the various methodologies available 
to assess the impact of structural reforms according to the needs of policy makers. 
One relevant conclusion from the study is that the applied tool should be able to distin-
guish short- and long-run effects and to consider the possibility of evaluating a compre-
hensive package of measures and of the time scales for their implementation. Moreover, 
the tool should be able to provide evidence about the effects of structural reforms on the 
macroeconomic performance for the overall economy.  
One of the main results is that no single econometric modelisation strategy dominates. 
All of the models have their strengths and weaknesses, and it is very important to keep 
them in mind when interpreting the impact of structural reforms. In principle, the analy-
sis should use more than one type of model. This strategy can reveal robust insights into 
the working of structural reforms. Furthermore, the simulation capabilities of existing 
models can be enhanced by the combination of the different tools, where the outcome of 
one model can be used as input in the other. 
In the light of this finding, the most appropriate tool that can be developed in the short-
term is the integration of a DSGE model (QUEST, in this case, due to its in-house 
availability) with various satellite models, to be developed. Satellite models are needed 
as some reforms cannot be assessed directly within QUEST. For a few, such as tax or 
social security reforms, the effects can be implemented directly as these policy variables 
are explicitly included in the model, but this is not the case for the majority of reforms. 
The satellite model is used in a first stage to quantify the effect of a certain policy 
change on an intermediate variable exogenous to QUEST. Then, in a second stage, the 
change in this variable is evaluated within the model in order to obtain the simulation 
results of the reforms considered. Satellite models can be constructed fairly easily, 
without changing the more complex structure of the core model, which greatly improves 
the flexibility of the model in investigating new policy issues. 
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Box 1. Decision tree for model selection 
 
The most accurate tool to assess the impact of structural reforms depends on the specific topic of re-
search, the objectives pursued and the scope of the study. The decision tree in the next page identifies the 
appropriate model depending on the topic of research. The selection process consists of several steps. The 
first principal question refers to those aspects related to reforms that policymakers want to analyse. Mi-
crosimulation models are important if the income distribution has to be considered. However, since the 
Commission’s interest is in macroeconomic performance, we have developed the decision tree for the 
aggregated level, leaving apart the micro area. It should be noted that some models allow some kind of 
heterogeneity: CGE models in particular can consider heterogeneous sectors or agents. Otherwise, the 
homogeneous agent framework is more important. However, there are some exceptions to the stylized 
decision tree. For example, the E3ME is a macroeconometric model incorporating sectors, and DSGEs 
also allow for some limited degree of heterogeneity. 
The next question that should be posed is whether it is important to distinguish between the di-
rect and indirect effects of the reforms. If it is not, the single equation approach is a proper choice, in 
particular for the ex-post evaluation of reforms, and has the advantage of not being very time-consuming. 
The technique is also appropriate in an ex-ante framework, provided that the coefficients are not subject 
to shifts due to policy change. However, of the two strategies that can be followed, one- or two-step, only 
the latter leads to interpretable though limited results in the sense of providing evidence regarding the 
transmission channels of structural reforms. The advantage is that single equations can also be used as 
satellite models feeding into other more complex approaches, like CGEs and DSGEs.  
Generally, the distinction between direct and indirect effects would suggest that different kinds of models 
are needed. Here, one needs to consider whether the analysis to be conducted has an ex-ante or ex-post 
focus. CGE and DSGE models can also be used for ex-post evaluation of reforms, but especially within 
an ex-ante analysis. In contrast, macroeconometric models are largely data-driven and only suitable for an 
ex-post setting. 
Another issue which has to be taken into account is whether the analysis is carried out for the overall 
economy or only for directly affected markets. All models apart from partial equilibrium models refer to 
the whole economy. However, focusing on only one sector makes it possible to consider certain industry-
specific regulations in isolation, and these models are faster to implement and easier to maintain. The 
disadvantage, however, is that they ignore spillovers from or into other sectors or assumes that the sector 
under study is very small and has only little impact on the rest of the economy.  
If linkages between sectors are considered to be important and the reforms to be analysed are as-
sumed to affect the whole economy, the next issue to consider is whether dynamic adjustment is impor-
tant or not. If it is not, CGE models are the most suitable tools. Here, data requirements are of limited 
importance as most parameters are calibrated. This of course comes at the cost of the models being less 
empirically founded than some counterparts such as macroeconometric models. 
When dynamic adjustment processes need to be included, either macroeconometric models or 
DSGEs should be chosen. The former is preferred for forecasting and the latter for policy simulation. The 
empirical fit might dominate the specification in the macroeconometric models and therefore, the rela-
tionships can be partially subject to the Lucas critique. Hence, macroeconometric models are better suited 
for the ex-post analysis of past reforms, although they can also be used for ex-ante analysis of future re-
forms, in particular to examine short-term impacts. DSGEs overcome the deficits of traditional mac-
roeconometric models. They are preferable for policy analysis in an ex-ante setting, that is, to investigate 
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In addition to satellite models being constructed, the structure of the core model could 
also be modified in order to include the effect of structural reforms. The main advantage 
of this approach is that the transmission channel is incorporated into the main model 
and considered directly. In this case, the transmission variables need to be specified in 
an endogenous way in the core model. 
Thus, the option of expanding the core model with more detailed formal sub-models is 
more attractive, because of its theoretical consistency. However, since CGEs and 
DSGEs are built on microeconomic theory, the behavioural equation has to be deter-
mined by microeconomic principles, which is not always feasible. Even in the case that 
there is a rigorous theoretical base for the specification, the main disadvantages of this 
approach is that it is time-consuming, can only be applied for a limited number of pol-
icy fields, adds complexity to the core model and makes it quickly unmanageable. As a 
result, there can be problems in the model solution due to numerical limitations in solv-
ing algorithms.  
Cross-sections analysis does not allow the impact of structural reforms to be disentan-
gled from other country-specific characteristics. Time series data allow for delays in the 
effects, but the time series approach is difficult to handle as there may be insufficient 
variation in the regressors. Thus, the best option is a dynamic panel structure, where the 
impact of the reforms will be separated from other country characteristics embedded in 
the fixed effects. With this approach, average effects across countries are uncovered. 
An additional aspect is that structural reforms could affect the overall economy, but also 
specific sectors. This is not a problem from the perspective of satellite models, because 
they can be specified for both the sectoral and macroeconomic level. However, the 
QUEST model does not support a sectoral decomposition and therefore, satellites for 
particular sectors cannot be linked to QUEST without further knowledge. In these cases, 
additional tools are required to bridge the gap. Based on input-output analysis, the im-
portance of individual sectors for the overall economy can be estimated on the grounds 
of the flows of intermediate inputs between the different sectors. Input-output matrices 
are available at least for some large countries, which can be considered as representative 
for the entire economic area. The new OECD indicators on the ‘knock on’ effects of 
regulation are of interest in this regard. 
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It should be noted, moreover, that severe limitations on indicators about structural re-
forms have to be taken into account, even if several databases are merged (EU Commis-
sion, OECD and Fraser Institute, among others). The information might be not available 
at the desired frequency and for all the considered countries. Missing values can be a 
serious problem, and the use of interpolation could bias the empirical results. In addi-
tion, many indicators are only rank-scaled, allowing insights into the direction, but not 
the size of the impact of the reform. For the latter, quantitative indicators would be in-
dispensable, so efforts should also be dedicated to improving the availability of this 
kind of data. 
Our recommendation to the European Commission in order to improve the available 
tools to quantify the impact of structural reforms is to consider the roadmap which fol-
lows. It describes the strategy that could be adopted in the short-run and some other 
actions that could be taken in a longer time horizon.  
The roadmap is divided into two sections: the preparatory work, and work effort needed 
to prepare the different tools. In the preparatory work (section A), the institutional re-
forms to be evaluated and the main transmission channels need to be identified. Then, a 
principal decision is required on the appropriate dataset. Indicators could either be taken 
from institutional databases or constructed for the sake of the project. In the latter case, 
structural reforms have to be translated into model variables. Preparatory work is 
needed in any case. The efforts needed for construction of the model (section B) depend 
on the time horizon. 
 
Roadmap for further model development 
 
A  Preparatory work 
Stage 1: Identification of the institutional reforms to be evaluated 
A1  Structural reforms to be evaluated in each country 
A2  Identification of transmission channels 
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Stage 2: Obtaining institutional data 
A3  Institutional databases or construction of specific indicators, depending on data 
  accuracy, scaling of indicators, etc 
A4  Institutional datasets might be merged to arrive at a longer time span, data need 
  to be interpolated to match frequency of macroeconomic data 
A5  Reforms expressed in terms of model variables, such as cost categories 
 
B  Preparing tools to analyse the impact of structural reforms 
Stage 3: Constructing single equation models 
B1  Define appropriate transmission variables for two-step approach 
B2  Specification of variable(s) describing the macroeconomic record 
B3  Estimation of single equation, control for endogeneity by using instruments, 
  tests for non-linearities and structural breaks 
B4  Single equations can be used as satellite models to more elaborated approaches 
Advantage: Swift implementation. Disadvantage: short and long run effects of reforms 
not distinguished, approach subject to Lucas critique 
 
Stage 4. Constructing partial equilibrium models 
B5  Identification of sectors directly affected by structural reforms 
B6  Analysis of feedbacks to other sectors. Partial models appropriate if spillovers 
 are  negligible 
B7  Model specification and solution, policy implications 
Advantage: Swift implementation; high detail in modelling; useful as benchmark and 
possible satellite model from the perspective of CGEs. Disadvantage: only directly af-
fected markets; reduced form does not allow disentanglement of the transmission chan-
nels; spillovers from or into other sectors ignored. 
 
Stage 5. Integration of satellite models developed in stages 3 and 4 with the QUEST 
model 
B8  Adaptation of models selected to cover reforms (identification of variables af-
  fected by structural reforms, possibilities to integrate satellite models)  
B9  Adaption of model specification, model solution, policy implications 
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Advantage: Consistent with economic theory, dynamic adjustment incorporated, Disad-
vantage: not much heterogeneity across agents or sectors, results assumption-driven 
(parameter calibration), but improved with the use of satellites. 
 
Stage 6. Adaptation and/or construction of CGE/DSGE models 
B10 Discussion  on  pre-existing  models 
B11  Possibilities of devoting resources to develop CGE/DSGE models 
B12  Adaptation of models selected to cover reforms (identification of variables af 
fected by structural reforms, possibilities to include satellite models) 
B13  Identification and inclusion of variables affected by structural reforms. Deve-
  lopment of specific modules (core and satellite models) 
B14  Specification of behavioural equations, calibration or estimation of parameters 
  according to previous literature, tests of model consistency (parameters must be 
  constant, standard simulations should lead to convincing results) 
B15  Policy analysis and implications of results 
Advantage: Models likely to be robust to Lucas critique (but testing required). CGEs 
more appropriate for static analysis and heterogeneous agents or sectors, DSGEs for 
dynamic analysis and limited heterogeneity across agents and sectors, suitable to ex-
plore sequence of reforms. Disadvantage: due to optimization framework, short-run 




 Strengths  Weaknesses 
Single equation models   
•  Different kinds of structural reforms can be easily analysed. 
•  Indicators of reforms can be easily introduced into these models (time series, 
cross section and panel). 
•  Interactions between reforms can be considered, but the capacity of this ap-
proach to discuss the impacts of a sequence of reforms is rather limited. 
•  Simple modelling software can be used. 
•  Results from these models can be used as inputs for more complex models. 
 
 
•  The effects of the reforms are analysed only for one particular variable related 
to macroeconomic performance or for an intermediate variable used as a 
transmitter of the effects of reform on economic growth. 
•  They are usually used for ex-post evaluations and subject to the Lucas critique 
for ex-ante evaluations. 
•  Only indirect effects of the reforms are considered, and, for this reason, they 
fail to provide unbiased estimates. 
•  Adjustment processes cannot be analysed (short-term effects cannot be distin-
guished from long-term effects), although some studies have applied VAR 





•  The main strength of these models is their internal consistency as they inte-
grate microeconomic mechanisms and institutional features into a consistent 
macroeconomic framework considering feedback mechanisms between all 
the markets included. 
•  They can be used for ex-ante evaluation. 
 
•  CGE analysis is focused only on the steady state when the economy is in a 
dynamic equilibrium and the impact of reforms is found by comparing the 
new steady state with the previous one, ignoring transitional dynamics. 
•  They lack statistical evidence, so they are usually calibrated  




6 Partial equilibrium models   
•  They are more transparent and comprehensive than CGE and probably easy 
to adapt to consider new policy questions. 
•  They are relatively inexpensive to use and maintain. Simple modelling soft-
ware can be used. 
•  Results from these models can be used as inputs for more complex models 
•  They can be used both for ex-post and ex-ante evaluation. 
 
 
•  These models only consider the effects of the reforms on sectors which are di-
rectly affected and they usually focus on three aspects: demand, supply and 
trade, providing much more detail than general equilibrium models. 
•  It ignores effects in other industries in the economy or assumes that the sector 
in question is very small and therefore has little impact on the rest of the 
economy. 
•  Due to the reduced form nature, they are unable to disentangle the transmis-
sion channels. 
•  Statistical data requirements are usually higher than for CGE 
 
Macroeconometric and DGSE 
models 
 
•  These models can be used for the study of the global effects of a wide range 
of policy measures ensuring a coherent framework for analysing interlink-
ages between variables and countries. 
•  They consider agents’ expectations (usually using a backward-looking ap-
proach) and are not subject to the Lucas critique. 
•  The specification of  the decision behaviour of economic agents can be used 
to study welfare-relevant questions. 
•  They are usually used for ex-ante evaluation. 
 
 
•  They are not easy to adapt to consider new policy questions. 
•  They fail to consider specific reforms affecting consumers’ and firms’ behav-
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